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Abstract
This Note argues that the EASD should implement suggestions offered in the Rudman Report
for Nasdaq because the success of EASDAQ depends on maintaining the trust of all its constituen-
cies in the fair operation of the market. Part I discusses the development of the current regulatory
structures of the US and EU securities markets. Part II examines the Rudman Report and the argu-
ments of those who criticize and praise it. Part III argues that the Rudman Report’s recommenda-
tions should be adopted by EASDAQ, because EASDAQ models itself on Nasdaq, and therefore
will encounter the same criticisms of self-dealing and conflicts of interest that surround the NASD,
EASDAQ should preempt such complaints by acknowledging the findings in the Rudman Report.
This Note concludes that the self-regulatory structure of the EASD and EASDAQ, combined with
adoption of the Rudman Report’s recommendations, will enable EASDAQ to implement fairness
and efficiency considerations essential to a successful market.
EASING THE REGULATION OF A PAN-EUROPEAN
SECURITIES MARKET: APPLYING THE
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE RUDMAN
REPORT TO EASDAQ
Maria A. Volarich*
[T]he need to safeguard the integrity of the securities mar-
kets is closely linked with the need to protect investors. It is a
fair assumption that if the law does not guarantee satisfactory
investor protection, investors will lose confidence in the fi-
nancial markets .... The concern to protect investors and to
safeguard the integrity of the financial markets may justify the
imposition of restrictions on the freedom to provide services.1
INTRODUCTION
A regulated securities 2 market 3 protects investors by encour-
* J.D. Candidate, 1997, Fordham University.
1. Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Alpine Investments bv v. Minister van
Financien, Case 384/93, [1995] E.C.R. _, _, [1995] 2 C.E.C. (CCH) 149, 163, 166.
The freedom to provide services is one of the four freedoms deemed necessary for the
creation of an internal market. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Feb. 7,
1992, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573 [hereinafter EC Treaty], incorporating changes made by
Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7,1992, O.J. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719,
31 I.L.M. 247 [hereinafter TEU]. The TEU, supra, amended the Treaty Establishing
the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 1973 Gr. Brit.
T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-I) [hereinafter EEC Treaty], as amended by Single European Act,
O.J. L 169/1 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinafter SEA], in TREATIES ESTABLISH-
ING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (EC Off'l Pub. Off. 1987). The EC Treaty includes
among the activities of the Community "an internal market characterised by the aboli-
tion, as between Member-States, of obstacles to the free movement of goods, persons,
services and capital." EC Treaty, supra, art. 3, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 588. See Commis-
sion of the European Communities, Completing the Internal Market: White Paper
from the Commission to the European Council, COM (85) 310 Final (June 1985)
[hereinafter White Paper] (detailing program and timetable for achieving internal mar-
ket); see also Walter Van Gerven &Jan Wouters, Free Movement of Financial Services and the
European Contracts Convention, in EC FINANCIAL MARKET REGULATION AND COMPANY LAW
43, 61 (Mads Andenas & Stephen Kenyon-Slade eds., 1993) (discussing White Paper's
approach to including financial services under EC Treaty).
2. See U.S. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c (1994) [hereinaf-
ter 1934 Act]. "Security" includes any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, in-
vestment contract, certificate of deposit, and any put, call, or option on any security. Id.
3. JOHN DOWNES &JORDAN E. GOODMAN, DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND INVESTMENT
TERMS 245 (3d ed. 1991) [hereinafter DICTIONARY OF FINANCE]. A market is a "public
place where products or services are bought and sold, directly or through in-
termediaries." Id. In Europe, many national markets, excluding the United Kingdom,
have minimal regulation. Andreas J. Roquette, New Developments Relating to the Interna-
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aging the free flow of information, which ensures market effi-
ciency.4 Moreover, a securities market accessible to small, en-
trepreneurial enterprises5 promotes job creation and industry
competitiveness by encouraging growth and technological ad-
vances.' In pursuit of these ideals, and in response to criticisms
that they are not being met,7 the United States' is considering
tionalization of the Capital Markets: A Comparison of Legislative Reforms in the United States,
the European Community, and Germany, 14 U. PA.J. INT'L Bus. L. 565, 596 (1994). What.
regulation there is of the European stock exchanges, however, is established under self-
regulatory organizations ("SROs"). Id. A SRO is an industry group, rather than a gov-
ernment agency, responsible for "the enforcement of fair, ethical, and efficient prac-
tices in the securities" market that it governs. DicrIONARY OF FINANCE, supra, at 404-05.
4. Council Directive No. 93/22/EEC, OJ. L 141/27, at 30 (1993) ("with the two-
fold aim of protecting investors and ensuring the smooth operation of the markets in
transferable securities"). See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Alpine Investments,
[1995] E.C.R. at -, [1995] 2 C.E.C. (CCH) at 163. Advocate GeneralJacobs states that
financial services directives "recognise that ensuring investor confidence in the securi-
ties markets will promote the smooth operation of those markets. By providing a regu-
latory framework they will encourage investment, and so enable the securities markets
to perform their economic function, namely the efficient allocation of resources." Id.
5. DICTIONARY OF FINANCE, supra note 3, at 125. An entrepreneur takes on the risks
of starting a new business. Id. Early stage financing, in addition to those funds accessi-
ble to the entrepreneur, may be provided by venture capital sources, which share in the
risk of the new enterprise for a share of the potential profits. Id. at 125, 503. Once the
business is established, shares may be sold to the public through, for example, an initial
public offering. Id. at 125. An initial public offering is an opportunity for the owners of
the corporation to realize profits from their enterprise, because their shares will be
given a market value reflecting expectations for the corporation's future growth. Id. at
200.
6. Commission Communication, COM (95) 498 Final at 3, 11 3, 6 (Oct. 1995)
[hereinafter European Capital Market] (communicating to Member States on feasibil-
ity of creation of European Capital Market for smaller entrepreneurially managed grow-
ing companies). Small, entrepreneurial enterprises, referred to as "small and medium-
sized enterprises" ("SMEs") within the European Union, account for 70% of total em-
ployment and are responsible for up to 40% of all new employment in manufacturing.
Commission Communication, COM (93) 528 Final at 7, 7 (Nov. 1993) [hereinafter
Financial Problems] (communicating to Member States on the financial problems ex-
perienced by small and medium-sized companies).
7. ScotJ. Paltrow, Inside Nasdaq. Questions About America's Busiest Stock Market. First
in a Series, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1994, at 1 [hereinafter Inside Nasdaq, Part 1]; Scot J.
Paltrow, Inside Nasdaq. Questions About America's Busiest Stock Market. Second in a Series,
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1994, at 1 [hereinafter Inside Nasdaq, Part 2]; ScotJ. Paltrow, Inside
Nasdaq. Questions About America's Busiest Stock Market. Third in a Series, L.A. TIMES, Oct.
22, 1994, at 1 [hereinafter Inside Nasdaq, Part 3]; ScotJ. Paltrow, Inside Nasdaq. Questions
About America's Busiest Stock Market. Fourth in a Series, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1994, at 1
[hereinafter Inside Nasdaq, Part 4]; Scot J. Paltrow, Inside Nasdaq. Questions About
America's Busiest Stock Market. Fifth in a Series, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1994, at 1 [hereinafter
Inside Nasdaq, Part 5]; Jerry Knight, Who's Being Helped? Regulators Probe Whether NASD
Can Own - and Oversee - Nasdaq, WASH. POST, Sept. 3, 1995, at H1; Michael Schroe-
der, Who Watches the Watchdog at Nasdaq? Critics From All Sides - Even From Within - Say the
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methods to improve the regulation of the National Association
of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation 9 ("Nasdaq") market,
the securities market on which small capitalization"0 issues pri-
marily trade.11 Similarly, the European Union1 2 ("EU") seeks to
create a regulatory environment for the implementation of a
pan-European market'" for small growth companies.14
Market Can No Longer Police Itself, Bus. WvL, May 15, 1995, at 102. Recent criticism sug-
gests that when the National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD") fines or sus-
pends members, the fines often go unpaid, and the individual may continue to work in
the industry. Floyd Norris, Mien a Fine Can Mean Nothing, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1996,
§ 3(1). During the past seven years, for example, the NASD imposed fines of US$201
million, but collected less than 19% of that amount. Id.
8. 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1994). The 1934 Act created the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC"), the regulatory agency responsible for governing the U.S. securi-
ties markets. Zvi BODIE ET AL., INVESTMENTS 90-91 (1989); NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
SECURITIES DEALERS, INC., SECURITIES REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 8 (2d ed. 1994)
[hereinafter SECURITIES REGULATION]. The Maloney Act of 1938 amended the 1934 Act
to authorize the registration with the Securities and Exchange Commission of national
securities associations of broker-dealers. SECURITIES REGULATION, supra, at 9; Maloney
Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 719, 52 Stat. 1070 (1938) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o (1994)). Through the Maloney Act of 1938 the SEC gained responsibility for the
actions of the broker-dealers, including trading in the over-the-counter markets. SECUR-
ITIES REGULATION, supra, at 9.
9. J. FRED WESTON & THOMAS E. COPELAND, MANAGERIAL FINANCE 36 (8th ed.
1989). Nasdaq is a computerized quotation system through which brokers and dealers
in the over-the-counter securities market communicate. Id. "Nasdaq" was previously
designated "NASDAQ." NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC., REPORT OF
THE NASD SELECT COMMITTEE ON STRUCTURE AND GOVERNANCE TO THE NASD BOARD OF
GOVERNORS 11-26 (1995) [hereinafter RUDMAN REPORT]. This Note adopts the conven-
tion used by the Rudman Report and consistently uses the "Nasdaq" designation.
10. DICTIONARY OF FINANCE, supra note 3, at 246. Market capitalization represents
the value of a corporation, determined by multiplying the number of outstanding
shares by the current market price of a share. Id.
11. European Capital Market, supra note 6, COM (95) 498 Final at 20, 1. Stan-
dard & Poor's defines issues eligible for inclusion in its small-cap stock index uses as
those falling within the 50th-83rd percentile of the entire market's value. STANDARD &
POOR'S, S&P SMALL CAP 600, 1995 DIRECTORY 5 (1995). For 1993, this represented a
capitalization range of between US$600 million and US$80 million. Id. The European
Association of Securities Dealers ("EASD") has not defined the ideal size of firms that
would be appropriately listed on the EASDAQ. EUROPEAN ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES
DEALERS AUTOMATED QUOTATION, DESCRIPTION OF THE EASDAQ PROJECT (1995) [here-
inafter EASDAQ]. This may be in recognition of the fact that many small corporations
that listed on Nasdaq have grown much larger, yet have chosen to remain listed on
Nasdaq. Knight, supra note 7, at HI. Examples of these firms include Microsoft and
Intel. Id.
12. EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. A, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 726-27.
13. European Capital Market, supra note 6, COM (95) 498 Final at 7, 1 15. A pan-
European securities market represents a single market for the European Union, as op-
posed to national markets maintained in individual Member States. Id. at 6-7, 13.
14. Id. at 15, 49.
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The National Association of Securities Dealers' 5 ("NASD")
owns Nasdaq and acts as the self-regulatory organization 16
("SRO") governing it.'7 Recent public criticism"8 has alleged
that the NASD is not fulfilling its obligations as a market regula-
tor.19 In response, the NASD appointed a Select Committee on
Structure and Governance 21 ("Select Committee") to evaluate
15. NASD Manual (CCH) 109 (July 1994). The NASD's Certificate of Incorpora-
tion indicates its purposes as:
(1) To promote through cooperative effort the investment banking and se-
curities business, to standardize its principles and practices, to promote
therein high standards of commercial honor, and to encourage and promote
among members observance of Federal and State securities laws;
(2) To provide a medium through which its membership may be enabled to
confer, consult, and cooperate with governmental and other agencies in the
solution of problems affecting investors, the public, and the investment bank-
ing and securities business;
(3) To adopt, administer and enforce rules of fair practice and rules to pre-
vent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices, and in general to pro-
mote just and equitable principles of trade for the protection of investors;
(4) To promote self-discipline among members, and to investigate and adjust
grievances between the public and members and between members;
(5) To establish, and to register with the [SEC] as, a national securities associ-
ation ....
Id. 1003. See WESTON & COPELAND, supra note 9, at 36 ("[NASD] is the self-regulatory
organization of the OTC markets").
16. DICTIONARY OF FINANCE, supra note 3, at 404-05. The 1934 Act provided for the
governance of the securities industry by SROs, with oversight by the SEC. 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o(3) (1994). The SEC delegates to SROs the day-to-day oversight of the securities
markets. BODIE, supra note 8, at 91. In addition to the NASD, SROs include the New
York Stock Exchange, the American Stock Exchange, and a number of regional stock
exchanges. SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 8, at 9. While these are registered ex-
changes, the NASD is the only national securities association registered under the
amended 1934 Act. Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 78o(3) (a) (1994).
17. NASD Manual, supra note 15, at 109.
18. Inside Nasdaq, Part 1, supra note 7, at 1; see supra note 7 and accompanying text
(describing criticisms of NASD's regulation of Nasdaq). Critics include small market
maker firms, academics, and investors. Inside Nasdaq, Part 1, supra note 7, at 1.
19. Knight, supra note 7, at HI; see supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing
criticisms of NASD's governance of Nasdaq). As a securities market regulator, the
NASD's responsibilities include overseeing Nasdaq, as well as NASD members' activities.
SECURITIES REGULATION, sup-a note 8, at 10. The NASD sets listing requirements for
corporations seeking to have their stock traded on Nasdaq and monitors companies'
maintenance of these standards. Id. at 12. The NASD also monitors market activity for
the purpose of detecting unusual or illegal trading activity. Id. In addition, the NASD
conducts formal investigations and may refer cases to the SEC for action beyond the
jurisdiction of the NASD. Id. at 14-15.
20. RUDMAN REPORT, supra note 9, at I-3. Former U.S. Senator Warren B. Rudman
chaired the Select Committee. Id. Other members of the committee included: Jean
W. Gleason (former Associate Director, SEC Division of Investment Management), Ste-
phen L. Hammerman (Vice Chairman, Merrill, Lynch & Co.; former Chairman, NASD
2234 FORDHAM INTERNATIONALLAWJOURVAL [Vol. 19:2230
the existing governance structure and recommend improve-
ments. 21  The Select Committee issued its report22 ("Rudman
Report") in September 1995, suggesting changes in the structure
and operation of the NASD. 3
In contrast to the United States, the European Union does
not have a pan-European market for small and medium-sized en-
terprises ("SMEs").24 With the adoption of the Investment Serv-
ices Directive2 5 ("ISD"), however, the European Union provided
a vehicle for the establishment of a pan-European securities mar-
ket.26  The European Association of Securities Dealers27
("EASD") proposed the creation of the EASD Automated Quota-
tion 2  ("EASDAQ") market.29  EASDAQ promotes itself as the
European Nasdaq.3 °
This Note argues that the EASD should implement sugges-
tions offered in the Rudman Report for Nasdaq because the suc-
cess of EASDAQ depends on maintaining the trust of all its con-
Board of Governors), Peter S. Lynch (Vice Chairman, Fidelity Research and Manage-
ment), Robert H. Mundheim (former Vice Chairman, NASD Board of Governors), Ir-
ving M. Pollack (former SEC Commissioner and former Director, SEC Division of Trad-
ing and Markets and SEC Division of Enforcement), and A.A. Sommer, Jr. (Vice Chair-
man, NASD Board of Governors and former SEC Commissioner). Id. at C-28.
21. Id. at 1-4.
22. Id. at C-28.
23. Id. at R-1-R-32.
24. European Capital Market, supra note 6, COM (95) 498 Final at 3, 3, 6; see
supra note 6 and accompanying text (defining SMEs).
25. Council Directive No. 93/22 EEC, supra note 4, O.J. L 141/27 (1993). Prior to
the issuance of the ISD, the European Union compiled a list of legislation necessary for
the completion of the internal market, including the field of investment services.
White Paper, supra note 1, COM (85) 310 Final at Annex 29. The effect of a directive is
to require the national governments of each Member State to enact legislation in com-
pliance with the directive prior to the implementation date stipulated in the directive.
Debevoise & Plimpton, The European Economic Community and European Economic Area, in
INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF INVESTMENT ADVISER REGULATION 119-20 (Marcia L. MacHarg
& Roberta R.W. Kameda eds., 1994) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL SURVEY].
26. EASDAOQ supra note 11, at 16.
27. Id. at 4. The EASD's primary responsibility will be to act as the SRO for EAS-
DAQ. European Capital Market, supra note 6, COM (95) 498 Final at 9, 24.
28. EASDAQ, supra note 11, at I (describing "a pan-European regulated stock mar-
ket which is liquid, efficient and fair, where fast growing companies with international
aspirations can raise capital from interested investors").
29. Id. at 4-5.
30. Id. at 9. David Tweed, New European Market Takes After Nasdaq, WALL ST. J. EUR.,
Feb. 22, 1996, at 10; Amelia Torres, Euro Nasdaq-Type Exchange to Start with 50 Firms,
REUTER EUR. COMMUNITY REP., June 23, 1995, available in LEXIS, Europe Library,
CURNWS File.
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stituencies in the fair operation of the market. Part I discusses
the development of the current regulatory structures of the U.S.
and EU securities markets. Part II examines the Rudman Report
and the arguments of those who criticize and praise it. Part III
argues that the Rudman Report's recommendations should be
adopted by EASDAQ because EASDAQ models itself on Nasdaq,
and therefore will encounter the same criticisms of self-dealing
and conflicts of interest that surround the NASD, EASDAQ
should preempt such complaints by acknowledging the findings
in the Rudman Report. This Note concludes that the self-regula-
tory structure of the EASD and EASDAQ combined with adop-
tion of the Rudman Report's recommendations, will enable EAS-
DAQ to implement fairness and efficiency considerations essen-
tial to a successful market.
I. HISTORY AND CURRENT FORM OF U.S. AND EU
SECURITIES MARKETS FOR SMALL COMPANIES
Corporations31 may raise capital by issuing debt32 or stock,33
both of which are classified as securities for the purpose of the
Securities Act of 193334 ("1933 Act") and the Securities and Ex-
change Act of 1934 ("1934 Act"). 5 The 1933 Act governs the
issuance of securities by corporations, 36 while the 1934 Act regu-
lates the securities markets, including the market for over-the-
counter 37 ("OTC") securities . 8 The NASD, overseen by the Se-
31. WESTON & COPELAND, supra note 9, at 55. In the United States, corporations
are legal entities created by a governmental unit. Id. The governmental unit is usually
a state, although certain corporations, such as banks, are also chartered by the federal
government. Id. A corporation is a separate entity from its owners and managers. Id.
This separateness leads to the four major advantages of the corporate structure: perpet-
ual life, limited liability, division of risk among the owners into many units thereby
limiting the risk exposure and facilitating diversification, and transferability of owner-
ship interest. Id.
32. Id. at 34. Debt reflects a promise to pay a creditor a specified amount, plus
interest, at a future date. Id.
33. Id. Stock generally refers to common stock, which represents ownership of a
corporation. Id..
34. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1994) [hereinafter 1933 Act].
35. 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1994). When introducing the bill that would become the
1934 Act, Senator King stated his belief that if provisions of the 1933 Act and 1934 Act
had been enacted previously "they would have prevented the debacle of 1929 so far as
the stock exchange, stock sales, and so forth, are concerned." 78 CONG. Rxc. 1991
(1934) (statement of Sen. King).
36. 15 U.S.C. § 77f (1994).
37. DIcrIONARv OF FINANCE, supra note 3, at 306. On the over-the-counter
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curities and Exchange Commission3 9 ("SEC"), regulates Nasdaq,
a quotation system that facilitates trading on the OTC market,4"
as well as the broker-dealer profession.41 Recent public criti-
cism 4 2 of the NASD and its governance of Nasdaq led to the crea-
tion of the Select Committee, which issued recommendations
for changing the NASD's governance structure.4 3
A. General Corporate Finance Background
Corporations raise capital for a variety of reasons, including
working capital" and financing research and development. 45 A
corporation seeking to finance its expansion, for example, may
choose to raise capital by issuing debt or issuing stock.46 By issu-
ing stock, a corporation can raise necessary capital while diluting
the investment of the current shareholders, 47 making the issu-
("OTC") market, dealers conduct trades over the telephone and computer networks,
rather than on an exchange. Id.
38. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f, 78k (1994).
39. 15 U.S.C. § 78d (1994). The SEC states that its "mission is to administer the
federal securities laws that seek to provide protection for investors. The purposes of
these laws are to ensure that the securities markets are fair and honest and to provide
the means to enforce the securities laws through sanctions where necessary." U.S. SEC.
AND EXCH. COMM'N, 1993 ANNUAL REPORT ii (1994). The 1934 Act, as amended by the
Maloney Act of 1938, dictates that the SRO for the OTC market is subject to SEC super-
vision. 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o, 78q(d) (1994); SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note
8, at 9.
40. C. DAVID CHASE, CHASE INVESTMENT PERFORMANCE DIGEST 78 (1994).
41. DICTIONARY OF FINANCE, supra note 3, at 99. "Broker-dealer" is a term used to
refer to brokerage firms, which often act as both brokers buying and selling securities
on behalf of investors and dealers buying and selling securities for their own account.
Id.
42. Inside Nasdaq, Part 1, supra note 7, at 1; see supra note 7 and accompanying text
(discussing criticisms of NASD's governance of Nasdaq).
43. RUDMAN REPORT, supra note 9, at C-2-C-3.
44. DICrIONARY OF FINANCE, supra note 3, at 515. Working capital finances the
processing of raw materials into finished goods that can be sold and converted into
cash. Id.
45. Id. at 369. Research and development represents the scientific and marketing
evolution of a new product or service. Id. Research and development financing, in
particular in the technology and biotechnology industries, is extensive because of high
rates of obsolescence and competition. Id.
46. WESTON & COPELAND, supra note 9, at 751, 781.
47. Id. at 755. Corporations often give existing shareholders the opportunity to
buy additional shares to avoid the dilution of their ownership in the corporation. See id.
(explaining preemptive rights). In a small, entrepreneurial enterprise, however, the
issuance of stock, and the resulting dilution of ownership, allows the existing sharehold-
ers to quantify the value of their investment in the corporation through the apprecia-
tion of the share price that accompanies initial public offerings and secondary offering.
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ance of stock particularly attractive to entrepreneurs who have
the bulk of their assets invested in the corporation.48
Securities are initially49 issued on a primary market and sub-
sequently traded on a secondary market.5 Securities trade on
securities markets, which may be either exchange-based5" or
screen-based. 52 Exchanges are physical locations where a spe-
cialist 53 buys and sells the stock of a particular listed54 corpora-
tion.15 In contrast, screen-based markets are computer systems
through which market makers56 quote 7 the prices at which they
DICTIONARY OF FINANCE, supra note 3, at 200; see supra note 5 and accompanying text
(explaining initial public offerings and their benefits for owners). In addition, share-
holders may liquidate all or part of their investment through the sale of their stock and,
therefore, realize the appreciation from their initial investment. See DICTIONARY OF
FINANCE, supra note 3, at 356 (defining realized profit).
48. Id. at 125; see supra note 5 and accompanying text (explaining entrepreneurs'
investment strategies).
49. DICTIONARY OF FINANCE, supra note 3, at 200; see supra note 5 and accompany-
ing text (discussing initial public offerings). An initial public offering is a corporation's
first issuance of stock to the public. DICTIONARY OF FINANCE, supra note 3, at 200.
50. WESTON & COPELAND, supra note 9, at 35. In primary markets, investment
banking firms sell newly issued securities acquired from the issuing corporation
through an underwriting syndicate or group. Id. After issuance, securities trade on
secondary markets. Id. These transactions take place on organized exchanges and in
less formal markets, such as the OTC market. Id.
51. Id. Organized securities exchanges are tangible physical entities. Id. Mem-
bers may purchase seats on the exchange, representing the right to buy and sell securi-
ties on the exchange. Id.
52. EASDAQ supra note 11, at 4 (characterizing Nasdaq as screen-based market);
see supra note 37 and accompanying text (describing OTC market as market where
trades are conducted over telephone lines and computers).
53. WESTON & COPELAND, supra note 9, at 36. A specialist is a firm that matches
the buy and sell orders that come in, almost simultaneously, on an exchange. Id. A
specialist is also responsible "for maintaining an orderly market in its particular secur-
ity." Id.
54. DICTIONARY OF FINANCE, supra note 3, at 234. A listed security is a stock or
bond accepted for trading by one of the securities exchanges registered with the SEC.
Id. Unlisted securities trade in the OTC market. Id.
55. WESTON & COPELAND, supra note 9, at 36.
56. Id. at 36. Market makers refers to brokers and dealers on the OTC market.
"who stand ready to buy and sell securities." Id. The market makers function much like
wholesale suppliers of goods or merchandise. Id. Where a stock trades infrequently,
perhaps because it is a new or small corporation, the matching of buy and sell orders by
a specialist may take an extended period of time. Id. To avoid this problem, market
makers maintain an inventory of securities. Id. "At one time, these securities were held
in a safe, and when they were traded, they were literally passed over-the-counter." Id.
57. DICTIONARY OF FINANCE, supra note 3, at 351. Market makers quote the highest
bid and the lowest asked price currently available. Id. The bid price is the highest price
the market maker is willing to pay for the quoted security, while the asked price is the
lowest price at which he is willing to sell that security. Id. The difference between the
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are willing to buy and sell stocks.58
The OTC market refers to all securities trading activity that
does not occur on an exchange.59 The OTC market handles the
stock of various U.S. corporations, some foreign stock issues,
most bonds of U.S. corporations and federal, state, and local
governments, and the stocks of most banks and insurance com-
panies.60 In addition, the OTC market handles new issues of se-
curities and most secondary distributions of large blocks of
stock, regardless of whether the issues are listed on an ex-
change.6' The OTC market, therefore, represents both a pri-
mary and a secondary market.62
B. The United States Securities Markets
No federal securities laws existed in the United States prior
to the 1929 stock market crash. 63 In response to the stock mar-
ket crash of 1929, however, Congress passed the 1933 Act and
the 1934 Act.6 4 The 1934 Act requires the registration of securi-
ties exchanges and national securities associations.6" Trading on
the secondary market takes place on these registered exchanges
and the OTC market. 66
bid and asked price is the spread. Id. at 427-28. The spread represents the market
makers' profit margin. ScotJ. Paltrow, Nasdaq Spreads Have Narrowed, Study Shows Invest-
ing: A Computer Analysis of the Top-Selling Issues Shows a Significant Change in the Trading
Margin for 49 of 50, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1995, at 1 [hereinafter Nasdaq Spreads].
58. EASDAQ, supra note 11, at 4; see supra note 52 and accompanying text (defin-
ing screen-based market).
59. WESTON & COPELAND, supra note 9, at 36.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 35-36.
63. RUDMAN REPORT, supra note 9, at HI-5. State laws prohibiting fraud in the sale
of securities, known as "blue sky laws, because they attempt to prevent the false promo-
tion and sale of securities representing nothing more than blue sky," did exist prior to
1929. BODIE, supra note 8, at 91.
64. Sen. Francis Maloney, Radio Address (Feb. 25, 1938), in 83 APP. TO THE CONG.
REc. 789, 790 (1938). "After the crash in 1929 when hundreds of thousands of Ameri-
can investors saw their savings swept away .... Congress gave immediate attention to
the subject [of abuses in the investment field]." Id. at 790; JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANS-
FORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 1-13 (rev. ed. 1995); RUDMAN REPORT, supra note 9, at
II-5.
65. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (1994).
66. WESTON & COPELAND, supra note 9, at 36; see supra notes 50-62 and accompany-
ing text (defining secondary market and OTC market).
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1. The 1933 Act and the 1934 Act
Congress established the 1933 Act to prevent frauds in the
sale of securities.67 The 1933 Act sets out requirements for the
issuance of securities" and their registration with the appropri-
ate government agency, 69 and attaches civil liability for a corpo-
ration's failure to comply with the requirements.7 ° In contrast,
the 1934 Act provides for the regulation of securities markets
and the OTC market.71 In 1938, Congress amended the 1934
Act7 2 by requiring the registration of any national securities asso-
ciation seeking to supervise the OTC market.7 1
67. 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1994). The preamble of the 1933 Act sets out that the pur-
pose of the "Act [is] to provide full and fair disclosure of the character of securities sold
in interstate and foreign commerce and through the mails, and to prevent frauds in the
sale thereof, and for other purposes." Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (1933)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1994)) (quoting preamble). In recom-
mending passage of the 1933 Act, President Franklin Roosevelt wrote to Congress that:
[T]he Federal Government cannot and should not take any action which
might be construed as approving or guaranteeing that newly issued securities
are sound in the sense that their value will be maintained .... There is,
however, an obligation upon us to insist that every issue of new securities to be
sold in interstate commerce shall be accompanied by full publicity and infor-
mation, and that no essentially important element attending the issue shall be
concealed from the buying public.
77 CONG. REc. 937 (1933) (letter from President Franklin D. Roosevelt).
68. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1994). These requirements include filing a registration state-
ment with the SEC and issuing a prospectus for use by prospective investors. Id.
69. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(5) (1994). Congress originally designated the Federal Trade
Commission ("FTC") as the agency with which securities issues would register. Securi-
ties Act of 1933, § 2(5), 48 Stat. at 75. With the creation of the SEC by the 1934 Act,
however, the SEC became the regulatory agency of the securities markets. 15 U.S.C.
§ 78d (1994); see supra note 8 and accompanying text (describing SEC's creation).
70. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k-I (1994).
71. 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1994). The preamble of the 1934 Act states its purpose as
"provid[ing] for the regulation of securities exchanges and of over-the-counter markets
operating in interstate and foreign commerce and through the mails, to prevent inequi-
table and unfair practices on such exchanges and markets, and for other purposes."
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. 78a (1994)) (quoting preamble).
72. Maloney Act of 1938, 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1994). Senator Francis T. Maloney in-
troduced the bill drafted by the predecessor of the NASD, the Investment Bankers Con-
ference, Inc. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC., NASD MANUAL 109
(Sept. 1991) [hereinafter NASD]. The preamble of the Maloney Act states that the
purpose of the Act is "to provide for the establishment of a mechanism of regulation
among over-the-counter brokers and dealers... to prevent acts and practices inconsis-
tent with just and equitable principles of trade." Id.; see supra note 8 and accompanying
text (explaining Maloney Act's purpose).
73. 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1994). Section 15A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
provided that:
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2. Trading on the U.S. Secondary Market
Securities trading within the secondary market occurs on
exchanges and in the OTC market. 4 The New York Stock Ex-
change75 ("NYSE") is the oldest stock exchange in the'United
States and is the largest in terms of the capitalization76 of the
issues traded on it.7 7 The American Stock Exchange78 ("Amex")
represents the second largest exchange in the United States.7"
Six additional securities exchanges are registered with the SEC."°
As a screen-based market, Nasdaq"' operates differently
from the securities exchanges.82 On Nasdaq, market makers"
compete in the marketplace on the basis of their spreads,84 while
on an exchange a single specialist trades in a particular issue.8 5
Any association of brokers or dealers may be registered with the [SEC] as a
national securities association... by filing with the [SEC] a registration state-
ment.., setting forth the information, and accompanied by the documents,
below specified:
(1) Such data as to its organization membership, and rules of procedure, and
such other information as the [SEC] may by rules and regulations require as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of inves-
tors; and (2) Copies of its constitution, charter, or articles of incorporation or
association, with all amendments thereto, and of its existing bylaws, and of any
rules or instruments corresponding to the foregoing, whatever the name,
hereinafter in this title collectively referred to as the 'rules of the association.'
Id.
74. WESTON & COPELAND, supra note 9, at 35-36; see supra notes 50-62 and accom-
panying text (defining secondary markets and OTC market).
75. DICTIONARY OF FINANCE, supra note 3, at 279. The New York Stock Exchange
("NYSE") is also known as the "Big Board." Id.
76. Id. at 246; see supra note 10 and accompanying text (defining capitalization).
77. Inside Nasdaq, Part 1, supra note 7, at 1. In mid-1994, while the NYSE had only
about half the listed corporations that Nasdaq had, the total capitalization of its listings
exceeded US$4 trillion, while the total capitalization of Nasdaq's quoted companies was
less than US$1 trillion. See id. (comparing NYSE and Nasdaq statistics).
78. DICTIONARY OF FINANCE, supra note 3, at 16.
79. Id.
80. U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM'N, 1993 ANNUAL REPORT 31 (1994).
81. WESTON & COPELAND, supra note 9, at 36; see supra note 9 and accompanying
.text (defining Nasdaq).
82. EASDAQ, supra note 11, at 4; see supra notes 51-58 and accompanying text
(describing differences between exchange-based and screen-based trading).
83. WESTON & COPELAND, supra note 9, at 36; see supra notes 56-57 and accompany-
ing text (describing role of market makers).
84. CHASE, supra note 40, at 78; see supra note 57 (defining spread). "On the
NYSE, spreads for most stocks are a mere eighth of a point [12.5 cents]." Inside Nasdaq,
Part 1, supra note 7, at 1.
85. WESTON & COPELAND, supra note 9, at 36; see supra note 53 and accompanying
text (defining specialist). See also CHASE, supra note 40, at 78-79 ("On the NYSE the
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Many corporations prefer Nasdaq because its quoting require-
ments are less stringent than the listing requirements of ex-
changes.86 The number of issues quoted on Nasdaq exceeds
that listed on the NYSE. 8 7
3. U.S. Market for Small Capitalization Corporations
The NASD registered with the SEC as a national securities
association in 1939.88 As a national securities association, the
NASD's responsibility is to regulate the business of its members,
including trading in the OTC market.8 9 Since 1971, the NASD
also has overseen Nasdaq, a system for the dissemination of quo-
tations on OTC securities.9"
a. NASD
On August 7, 1939, the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion91 ("SEC") approved the NASD's initial registration state-
ment as a national securities association.9" The NASD repre-
sented the efforts of some members within the securities indus-
try to regulate itself.9" The SEC continues to oversee the SROs,
including the NASD. 94
average number of common stocks per specialist is approximately 25 .... On the
Nasdaq the average number of marketmakers per security is 11.5.").
86. CHASE, supra note 40, at 78.
87. Inside Nasdaq, Part 1, supra note 7, at i (noting that in mid-1994 Nasdaq had
4849 quoted companies, while NYSE had 2499 listed companies).
88. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (1994). The 1934 Act provides that "[a]n association of bro-
kers and dealers may be registered as a national securities association ... by filing with
the [SEC] an application for registration." Id.
89. SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 8, at 9.
90. NASD, supra note 72, at 112.
91. See 15 U.S.C. § 78d (1994) (establishing SEC).
92. NASD, supra note 72, at 110.
93. Id. The Securities Act of 1934 states that:
The rules of the association are designed to prevent fraudulent and manipula-
tive acts and practices, to promote just and equitable principles of trade, to
foster cooperation and coordination with persons engaged in regulating,
clearing, settling, processing information with respect to, and facilitating
transactions in securities, to remove impediments to and perfect the mecha-
nism of a free and open market and a national market system, and, in general,
to protect investors and the public interest; and are not designed to permit unfair
discrimination between customers, issuers, brokers, or dealers ... or to regu-
late by virtue of any authority conferred by this chapter matters not related to
the purpose of this chapter or the administration of the association.
1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(6) (1994).
94. 15 U.S.C. § 78s (1994); SECURrriES REGULATION, supra note 8, at 10. The SEC
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The NASD is organized into a Board of Governors95
("NASD Board"), headed by a Chairman of the Board, and
eleven District Committees.96 The NASD Board determines na-
tional policy with respect to regulatory and market operation ac-
tivities of the NASD.9" The NASD membership is divided into
eleven Districts, with one Governor from each district elected by
member firms to serve on the NASD Board. 8 Each District has a
District Committee responsible for enforcing NASD policy.99
The Chairman of the Board appoints standing1°° and special 1 '
committees to study specific areas of NASD activity and to advise
the NASD Board. 10 2 The NASD Board selects the NASD Presi-
dent, who reports to the NASD Board and is responsible for en-
suring that NASD Board policies are executed properly. 10 3 The
maintains responsibility for the performance of the NASD, including its ability to regu-
late. Id. All SRO rules and regulations, for example, must be approved by the SEC
prior to taking effect. Id.
95. NASD Manual, supra note 15, at 109.
96. Id. In 1990, in response to the recommendations of a Special Committee, the
NASD decreased the proportion of district governors on the NASD Board, "increased
the number of at-large industry governors," and assigned three seats to representatives
of the public and three seats to issuers. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS,
INC., FINAL REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON NASD STRUCTURE AND GOVERNANCE 9
(Jan. 1990). District governors, however, retained an absolute majority of the rede-
signed NASD Board. RUDMAN REPORT, supra note 9, at 11-23.
97. NASD Manual, supra note 15, at 109. As of 1995, the Board consisted of the
President of the NASD, 13-15 Governors elected by NASD members in the various Dis-
tricts, and 11-13 Governors elected by the Board ("At-Large Governors"). NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC., EXHIBITS TO THE REPORT OF THE NASD SE-
LECT COMM. ON STRUCTURE AND GOVERNANCE TO THE NASD BD. OF GOVERNORS E (1995)
[hereinafter RUDMAN EXHIBITS]. In total, the NASD Board consisted of 21 industry
members and 5 public members. Id. at A.
98. NASD Manual, supra note 15, at 109. The NASD selects At-Large Governors
from among investors, Nasdaq-quoted companies, the securities industry generally, and
related professions, such as accounting, business, education, and the law. Id.
99. Id. at 110.
100. Id. Committees, comprised of volunteers from the securities industry and the
public sector, advise the NASD Board and make recommendations regarding specific
areas of NASD activity. Id. Standing committees include: Arbitration, Institutional In-
vestors, International Investment Companies, Issuer Affairs, Market Operations Review,
Market Surveillance, Marketing, Membership, Nasdaq Listing Qualifications, Nasdaq
Hearing Review, National Business Conduct, Operations, State Liason, and Trading.
Id. The Issuer Affairs Committee consists of chief financial officers ("CFOs") of Nas-
daq-quoted companies. John S. DeMott, CFO Input to NASD, CFO, Feb. 1996, at 12.
101. NASD, supra note 72, at 111. Special committees are selected to study a par-
ticular issue and do not serve on an ongoing basis. Id. The Select Committee is an
example of a special committee. RUDMAN REPORT, supra note 9, at 1-3.
102. NASD, supra note 72, at 111.
103. Id. at 112.
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NASD President and his staff serve a primarily administrative
function.1 0
4
The NASD's three principal functions" 5 include rulemak-
ing, 106 regulation,010 and the dissemination of quotations"' on
OTC securities. 109 The NASD promulgated the NASD Rules of
Fair Practice 1 0 which, together with the NASD By-Laws, 1 con-
stitute the rules of the NASD. 1 2 The NASD carries out its regu.-
latory responsibilities through member education, on-site re-
views of member firms to determine their compliance with fed-
eral securities laws and NASD regulations, continuous
automated surveillance of Nasdaq, and registration and testing
of securities professionals.11 The NASD also provides services,
such as arbitration, that enable investors and members to resolve
disputes.1 1 4 NASD membership entitles an investment firm to
104. Id.
105. RUDMAN REPORT, supra note 9, at 111-2.
106. NASD Manual, supra note 15, 2001 (containing NASD Rules of Fair Prac-
tice).
107. RUDMAN REPORT, supra note 9, at 111-2. The NASD brings disciplinary pro-
ceedings against member firms and "registered representatives" regarding alleged viola-
tions of NASD rules, SEC regulations, or securities laws. Id. The NASD also monitors
trading on Nasdaq and investigates suspected violations of the rules governing the use
of Nasdaq, SEC regulations, and securities laws. Id.
108. DiCriONARY OF FiNANCE, supra note 3, at 351; see supra note 57 and accompa-
nying text (discussing quotations as prices at which market makers will buy or sell secur-
ities).
109. NASD, supra note 72, at 112. In addition to these core activities, the NASD
performs additional services, including the review and approval of underwriting agree-
ments entered into by member firms, the arbitration of disputes between member firms
and their customers and employees, the administration of licensing examinations, the
review of all member advertising and periodic financial reporting, and the maintenance
of a database containing the employment and disciplinary histories of approximately
500,000 licensed or registered employees of NASD member firms. RUDMAN REPORT,
supra note 9, at 111-3.
110. NASD Manual, supra note 15, 2005 (stating in preamble that "[t]hese Rules
of Fair Practice shall apply to all members and persons associated with a member").
111. Id. 1101.
112. Id. 2101 (defining NASD Rules as Rules of Fair Practice and By-laws).
113. Id. at 109.
114. Id. NASD disciplinary procedures, however, are not designed to recover dam.-
ages or to obtain relief for any party. Id. at 110. Instead, disciplinary procedures are
"intended to promote membership compliance with high standards of commercial
honor and just and equitable principles of trade." Id. District committees have primary
responsibility for conducting disciplinary procedures. Id. Sanctions imposed may take
the form of censure, fine, suspension, expulsion of a firm from the NASD, or suspen-
sion or prohibition of an individual's association with a member firm. Id. at 111. In
effect, the sanction may be prohibition of conducting business as a broker-dealer, be-
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participate in the OTC securities business, to distribute new is-
sues underwritten by NASD members, and to distribute shares of
investment companies sponsored by NASD members.'15 Since
1971, the NASD has used Nasdaq as a system for gathering and
disseminating quotations." 6 Since the NASD's purchase of Nas-
daq in 1976, it has both owned and regulated Nasdaq. l 7
b. Nasdaq
Nasdaq is a computerized system" 8 that collects and stores
quotations from a nationwide networkl1 9 of OTC dealers. 2 °
These dealers make markets12 1 in stocks that have met Nasdaq's
inclusion requirements.12 2  Through Nasdaq, up-to-the-sec-
cause a broker-dealer must be a NASD member unless it conducts business only on a
national exchange of which it is a member. SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 8, at 9.
115. NASD, supra note 72, at 110.
116. RUDMAN REPORT, supra note 9, at C-7. Nasdaq was established in 1971 as a
relatively simple automated quotation system. Id. In 1964, Congress amended the 1934
Act to require national securities associations to establish "provisions governing the
form and content of quotations relating to securities sold otherwise than on a[n] ...
exchange." 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(11) (1994). In response, in 1968, the NASD entered
into a contract with a vendor to design what would become Nasdaq. RUDMAN REPORT,
supra note 9, at 11-26. "Under the contract, the vendor owned the system, subject to
NASD supervision and an option to purchase. The NASD owned the information on
the system, controlled the listing of securities, set user fees, and established the system's
rules." Id.
117. Id. at 11-27.
118. NASD Manual, supra note 15, at 113. "Using advanced computer and tele-
communications technologies, Nasdaq enables securities firms to execute transactions
for investors and for themselves from anywhere they are located within an environment
of real-time trade reporting and automated market surveillance." Id.
119. CHASE, supra note 40, at 79-80. The Securities Acts Amendments of 1975
mandated the creation of the Nasdaq National Market System ("NMS") to increase
competition and efficiency in the securities markets. 15 U.S.C. § 78k-1 (1994); SENATE
COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, SECURITIES AcTs AMENDMENTS OF
1975, S. REp. No. 75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 179;
CHASE, supra note 40, at 79.
120. NASD, supra note 72, at 112. Dealers are in the business of buying and selling
securities for their own account. 15 U.S.C. § 78c (1994). Dealers are called market
makers in the OTC market and specialists on the exchanges. DICrIONARY OF FINANCE,
supra note 3, at 239; see supra notes 53, 56 and accompanying text (defining market
maker and specialist).
121. NASD Manual, supra note 15, 1802. Schedule D of the NASD By-Laws de-
fines "Nasdaq Market Maker" as "a dealer that, with respect to a security, holds itself out
(by entering quotations in the Nasdaq System) as being willing to buy and sell such
security for its own account on a regular and continuous basis and that is registered as
such." Id.
122. Id. "Inclusion requirements" are the OTC equivalent of listing requirements
on exchanges. DICrIONARY OF FINANCE, supra note 3, at 234; see supra note 54 (defining
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ond123 quotations are transmitted electronically to brokerage
firms throughout the United States. 124 Nasdaq, therefore, repre-
sents a computer-based market, without the specific location or
trading floor of an exchange. 2 5
The NASD owns and operates Nasdaq through a wholly-
owned subsidiary, The Nasdaq Stock Market, Inc. 126 ("Nasdaq,
Inc."), a for-profit Delaware corporation. 12  A Board of Direc-
tors121 ("Nasdaq Board") manages Nasdaq, Inc.' 29 The Nasdaq
Board is not independent of the NASD.' Rather, the Nasdaq
Board functions as a committee of the NASD Board.1 ' In partic-
ular, ultimate authority over Nasdaq affairs rests with the NASD
Board. 3 2 The NASD Board, moreover, oversees committees
dealing with Nasdaq policy issues.133
4. Problems Leading to the Rudman Report
Nasdaq has become one of the World's largest securities
listed security). The NASD has broad discretionary power to consider a security's eligi-
bility for initial and continued inclusion in Nasdaq. NASD Manual, supra note 15,
1803. Among the requirements for inclusion, an issue must have at least two market
makers, assets of at least US$4 million, a minimum bid price of US$3, and, in the case
of common stock, there must be at least 100,000 publicly held shares. Id. For initial
inclusion, these shares must have a market value of at least US$1 million. Id.
123. 15 U.S.C. § 78k-i (1994). In complying with the Securities Acts Amendments
of 1975, the SEC required that trades on the NMS be reported in real-time, the actual
time that they occur. Id.; CHASE, supra note 40, at 79.
124. CHASE, supra note 40, at 79.
125. RUDMAN REPORT, supra note 9, at 11-2; see supra notes 51-58 and accompanying
text (explaining difference between exchange-based market and screen-based market).
126. RUDMAN REPORT, supra note 9, at I-1. When the NASD first sought a vendor
to design Nasdaq, the vendor was to own the system, subject to the NASD option to
purchase. Id. at 11-26. The NASD owned the information on the system. Id. The
NASD exercised its option to purchase Nasdaq in 1976. Id. at 11-27.
127. Id. at III-1.
128. Id. at 111-1-111-2. Nasdaq's By-Laws charge the Nasdaq Board with organizing,
developing, and operating the computer and communications facilities that serve as
Nasdaq, "for the purposes of: (i) supporting the operation, regulation, and surveillance
of [Nasdaq] . . . (ii) supporting the efficient clearance and settlement of securities
transactions, [and] ... (iv) assisting the [NASDI in fulfilling its self-regulatory responsi-
bilities." Id.
129. Id. at III-1.
130. Id. at 111-2, 111-27; see supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text (discussing
standing and special committees advising NASD Board).
131. RUDMAN REPORT, supra note 9, at 111-2, 111-27.
132. Id.
133. Id. The Trading Committee and the Listing Qualification Committee, for
example, report to the NASD Board but handle Nasdaq policy matters. Id.; see supra
note 100 (discussing NASD's standing committees).
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markets. 134  In spite of this achievement, since mid-1994 the
NASD and Nasdaq have been the subject of public criticism. 35
The source of the criticism was a study indicating that Nasdaq
market makers, rather than competing over spreads, were col-
luding to maintain wide spreads."3 6 Critics implicated the
NASD's regulation of Nasdaq for failing to supervise the market
makers.137 Specifically, reports in the press criticized the
NASD's governance of Nasdaq, suggesting that large member
firmsa38 control the market to the detriment of small NASD
members, individual investors, and the public.1
3 9
134. RUDMAN REPORT, supra note 9, at C-1. Size can be measured by the number of
issues listed on the market, the total capitalization of the listed issues, or the daily trad-
ing volume. Id. Currently, over 5000 issues are listed on the Nasdaq. Id. These issues
have a total capitalization of over US$1 trillion. Id. The daily volumes have reached
600 million shares. Id. In 1994, Nasdaq's trading volume exceeded that of the NYSE.
Inside Nasdaq, Part 1, supra note 7, at 1.
135. RUDMAN REPORT, supra note 9, at C-2. Much of this criticism has been di-
rected at the alleged collusion of market makers in quoting prices. Inside Nasdaq, Part
1, supra note 7, at 1. In light of the criticisms directed at the NASD, the Department of
Justice and the SEC are investigating the NASD's performance as a SRO. Id. The De-
partment of Justice's investigation focuses on alleged collusion among market makers
in the setting of the spread, the delayed reporting of trades, and the failure to give the
best price available, particularly to individual investors. Scot J. Paltrow, Probe Launched
Into Nasdaq Stock Trading, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1994, at 1 [hereinafter Probe Launched];
Knight, supra note 7, at H1. The delayed reporting of large trades may affect stock
prices, possibly for the purpose of manipulating stock prices. Id. The SEC's investiga-
tion is centered around allegations that the NASD is allowing Nasdaq to function for
the benefit of large member firms to the detriment of investors. Id.
136. William G. Christie & Paul H. Schultz, Why Do Nasdaq Market Makers Avoid
Odd-Eighth Quotes, 49 J. FIN. 1813, 1813-15 (1994). See Scot J. Paltrow, Study Suggests
Collusion Among Brokerage Firms Wall Street: Findings by Two Business Professors Indicate a
Possible Rigging of Trades on the Nasdaq Market, L.A. TIMES, May 26, 1994, at 1 (noting that
large market maker firms were reluctant to comment on study). In addition, a General
Accounting Office report faulted the SEC, the NASD, and the national exchanges for
failing to bar permanently unethical brokers, and taking informal disciplinary action
that is not reported to the public. Scot J. Paltrow, GAO Assails Stockbroker Punishment
Securities: A Report Chides SEC and the Exchanges for Not Doing Enough to Get 'Rogues' Out of
the Business, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1994, at 1.
137. Schroeder, supra note 7, at 102.
138. RUDMAN REPORT, supra note 9, at 111-6. Large member firms, however, are a
small percentage of total NASD membership. Id. at 111-4, 111-12. Of the approximately
5500 member firms at the end of 1994, the average number of registered representa-
tives at over 5000 was only 20. Id. A registered representative is an employee of a
member firm, registered with the SEC, who advises clients on securities to buy and sell
and receives a commission on the trades he generates. DICrIONARY OF FINANCE, supra
note 3, at 361.
139. RUDMAN REPORT, supra note 9, at C-2; see Inside Nasdaq, Part 1, supra note 7, at
1 (outlining various complaints made against NASD's regulation of Nasdaq).
1996] APPLYING RUDMAN TO EASDAQ 2247
In response to these criticisms, the NASD President and the
Chairman of the SEC140 agreed to a review of the NASD's gov-
ernance to assess its fulfillment of its self-regulatory obliga-
tions."' In November 1994, the NASD Board adopted a resolu-
tion 14 2 appointing the Select Committee 14 and promulgated a
charter designating its purposes and goals. 144  The charter
charged the Select Committee with reviewing the manner in
which the NASD carries out its responsibilities as a SRO and the
governance structures of the NASD and Nasdaq.'45
The Select Committee limited its review by not considering
matters otherwise under review. 146 Pursuant to the charter, the
Select Committee considered the historical basis and current
structure of the NASD and Nasdaq, conducted nearly two-hun-
140. DICrnONARY OF FINANCE, supra note 3, at 398-99. The SEC is comprised of five
commissioners, each appointed by the President of the United States for five-year
terms. Id. To ensure the independence of the SEC, no more than three members may
be of any one political party. Id. The President selects the Chairman of the SEC. Id.
141. RUDMAN REPORT, supra note 9, at 1-3.
142. Id.
143. Id.; see supra note 20 (revealing Select Committee members and their affilia-
tions).
144. Id. at 1-4. Specifically, the charter mandated the Select Committee:
[T]o review the manner in which the NASD carries out its responsibilities as a
self-regulatory organization with respect to the regulation and oversight of the
Nasdaq Stock Market; and to review the governance structures of the NASD
and the Nasdaq Stock Market, including the operation and composition of the
Boards, committees and other entities involved in the governance of the cor-
porations.
Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at C-2, 1-4, 1-5. The charter, for example, explicitly excluded areas under
investigation by the Department ofJustice or the SEC. Id. at 1-4. The Select Committee
elected not to review the NASD's arbitration program, since it was already under review
by another NASD Committee. Id. at 1-5. In addition, the Select Committee did not
attempt to examine the Nasdaq market technology, believing such a review was "beyond
its particular competence." Id. at 1-5. The SEC's investigation focuses on allegations
that NASD is running Nasdaq for the benefit of the major investment firms, to the
detriment of public investors. Knight, supra note 7, at Hi. The Department ofJustice
investigation focuses on allegations of collusive price-fixing. Schroeder, supra note 7, at
102. The price-fixing allegations focus on a lack of competition between the market
makers resulting in a wide spread between bid and ask prices on the market. Inside
Nasdaq, Part 1, supra note 7, at 1. This wide spread allows market makers to profit from
the alleged lack of competition, particularly at the expense of small investors, since
larger investors, such as institutions, may trade "inside the spread." Id. While the Rud-
man Report does not address these issues specifically, it does address the governance
structure that could permit such actions to occur, in violation of NASD rules, and then
allow the perpetrators to go unpunished. RUDMAN REPORT, supra note 9, at 1-6.
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dred interviews, reviewed NASD's enforcement and disciplinary
procedures, and compared the governance structures of other
SROs 147 with that of the NASD and Nasdaq.148 On September
15, 1995, the Select Committee submitted the Rudman Report
to the NASD Board, concluding that the NASD had discharged
its self-regulatory responsibilities professionally and reason-
ably. 149
Although the Select Committee's review did not support
claims asserting that the NASD is controlled by and for the bene-
fit of Nasdaq market makers or that the NASD uses its regulatory
powers to advance the interests of large member firms, it did
recommend several organizational changes. 150 The Rudman Re-
port addressed several areas, including corporate structure,"'
discipline and enforcement,1 52 district committees, internal re-
view,15 coordination with other regulators,1 5 4 membership vot-
ing,155 professional staff,156 individual investors, and the alloca-
147. RUDMAN REPORT, supra note 9, at 1-6-1-7. In particular, the Select Committee
used the NYSE and the Amex exchanges for its comparison. Id.
148. Id. at 1-5--7.
149. Id. at C-21. The Select Committee stated, however, that these duties were not
discharged "with perfection or without difficulty." Id.
150. Id. at C-21.
151. Id. at R-1-R-20. Specifically, the Rudman Report recommended making the
Nasdaq Board independent of the NASD Board, establishing an independent subsidi-
ary, NASD Regulation ("NASDR"), to regulate the broker-dealer profession, and in-
creasing the public representation on the NASD Board, Nasdaq Board, and NASDR
Board to at least 50%. Id. at R-1-R-2.
152. Id. at R-20-R-25. In particular, the Rudman Report suggested that the NASDR
be kept independent of the NASD, with professional hearing officers to ensure "effec-
tive, fair, and professional enforcement." Id. at R-20.
153. Id. at R-27-R-28. The Rudman Report encouraged the development of an
Office of Internal Review to conduct audits of the operations at the NASD and its oper-
ating subsidiaries, including district operations. Id. The Office of Internal Review
would also serve as an ombudsman, receiving and addressing concerns and complaints
from any source, whether internal or external. Id.
154. Id. at R-28-R-29. The Rudman Report advocated the appointment of a liason
within the NASDR to coordinate regulatory efforts with the SEC, state regulators, and
the other SROs. Id. The goals of such coordination are identifying industry-wide regu-
latory issues, fostering cooperation with the SEC and other regulators, and reducing
duplicative enforcement efforts. Id.
155. Id. at R-29. The Rudman Report supported the NASD's decision to eliminate
the requirement of membership voting on all changes to the Rules of Fair Practice,
determining that executing the voting was burdensome and expensive. Id. The Rud-
man Report found satisfactory the NASD's retention of the authority to submit a propo-
sal to membership voting if it is deemed appropriate. Id.
156. Id. at R-29-R-30. In recommending a greater role for the professional staffs of
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don of financial resources. 57
C. The European Markets Prior to the Investment Services Directive!
EASDAQ
The EC Treaty' 58 allows for the creation of an internal mar-
ket among the EU Member States.159 Prior to the issuance of the
ISD, European securities markets were primarily self-regulatory,
with minimal government regulation.1 6  The adoption of the
ISD, however, lays the foundation for mutual recognition of se-
curities market regulation between the Member States.' 6' In ad-
dition, the ISD furnishes a framework for the development of a
pan-European securities market. 162
1. Basis in the EU
The EC Treaty'6 3 provides for the creation of an internal
market, with the abolition of obstacles to the free movement of
goods, persons, services, and capital. 164 Beginning in 1985, the
European Union changed its approach toward creating an inter-
nal market from one of legislative harmonization 65 to that of
mutual recognition.' 66 In its drafting of the ISD, the European
Union mandated mutual recognition of investment services leg-
the NASD, Nasdaq, and the NASDR, the Rudman Report suggests that a more active
function will increase the general oversight of the organizations. Id.
157. Id. at vi-vii.
158. EC Treaty, supra note 1, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573.
159. Id. art. 3, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 588.
160. Manning G. Warren III, The European Union's Investment Services Directive, 15 U.
PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 181, 185 (1994) [hereinafter Warren, Investment Services Directive].
During the 1980's, for example, seven of the Member States did not require that pro-
spectus disclosures be made to investors, and none of the Member States had a securi-
ties regulatory agency. Id. The English Companies Act, however, constituted the basis
of the 1933 Act. SELIGMAN, supra note 64, at 63.
161. Council Directive No. 93/22/EEC, supra note 4, OJ. L 141/27, at 27 (1993).
162. EASDAQ, supra note 11, at 16-17.
163. EC Treaty, supra note 1, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573.
164. Id. art. 3, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 588.
165. Id. art. 100a, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 633-34. See White Paper, supra note 1,
COM (85) 310 Final at 18, 61 (stating that Article 100 of EC Treaty cannot continue
to be relied upon in attaining genuine common market). See also id. at 18, 62 (ex-
plaining that alternate strategy must serve objective of building flexible and expanding
market). Future use of legislative harmonization would be limited primarily to "laying
down essential health and safety requirements." Id. at 19, 65.
166. Id. at 18, 1 63 (asserting that mutual recognition, supported by Articles 30
and 36 of EC Treaty, "which prohibit national measures which would have excessively
and unjustifiably restrictive effects on free movement").
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islation. 1
6 7
2. Trading on the European Secondary Markets Prior
to the ISD
Securities regulation outside of the United Kingdom was al-
most nonexistent until the issuance of the ISD.' 6 8 In the United
Kingdom, the Financial Services Act of 1986169 ("FSA") provided
the legislative framework for regulation of securities markets af-
ter the "Big Bang. ' 170 In contrast to the United Kingdom, Ger-
many provides an example of one of the least regulated national
markets within the European Union. 1
71
a. United Kingdom
The FSA stipulates the requirements that a SRO must meet
to be recognized by the governmental authority. 172 The FSA re-
quires SROs to have rules and procedures that protect investors,
to ensure that their members are fit for the investment business
167. Council Directive No. 93/22/EEC, supra note 4, O.J. L. 141/27, at 27 (1993).
"[W]hereas, by virtue of mutual recognition, investment firms authorized in their home
Member States may carry on any or all of the services covered by this Directive for which
they have received authorization throughout the Community by establishing branches
or under the freedom to provide services .... " Id. O.J. L 141/27, at 27 (1993).
168. Warren, Investment Services Directive, supra note 160, at 185-86. See SELIGMAN,
supra note 64, at 63 (establishing English Companies Act as basis for 1933 Act).
169. Financial Services Act, 1986, ch. 60 (Eng.). The United Kingdom intended
for the Financial Services Act of 1986 ("FSA") to deviate from the 1933 Act and the
1934 Act, believing that the SEC is too bureaucratic and should not be replicated. Har-
old D. Bloomenthal, Financial Services Act 1986, in 1OB INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS
AND SECURITIES REGULATION 6A-1, 6A-4 (1989) [hereinafter Bloomenthal]. Instead, the
FSA created a multi-tiered self-regulatory structure. Id.
170. Bloomenthal, supra note 169, at 6A-1, 6A-4. The "Big Bang" deregulated the
London Stock Exchange, and renamed it the International Stock Exchange ("ISE").
Id. at 6A-3; see generally LIFE AFTER BIG BANG (Simon MacLachlan ed., 1987) (discussing
potential effects of Big Bang). As a result of this deregulation, the ISE accepted many
new members and replaced its exchange-based trading system with a screen-based sys-
tem of market makers called the Stock Exchange Automated Quotation System
("SEAQ"). Id. The SEAQ was modelled after Nasdaq. Id.
171. Gerhard Wegen, Germany, in INTERNATIONAL SECURrrIEs LAW 127 (1992).
172. Id. at 6A-8. The governmental authority is the Department of Trade and In-
dustry ("DTI"), which delegates many regulatory powers to a private sector Designated
Agency, the Securities and Investments Board ("SIB"). Id. at 6A-5. These powers may
be delegated where the DTI is assured that investors are being afforded an adequate
level of protection. Id. See also R v. Life Assurance and Unit Trust Regulatory Organisa-
tion, Ltd., ex parte Ross, 1 All E.R. 422 (1992) (discussing SRO for life assurance and
unit trust business under FSA, court stated purpose of SRO as "intervening in the busi-
ness of a member to protect investors").
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of the organization, and to monitor compliance with and en-
force the SROs' rules. 173 The governing body of a SRO must
include public representation to balance the interests of the
members of the SRO and the interests of the public. 7
Under the FSA, members of a SRO, as well as persons au-
thorized in another Member State, may engage in the invest-
ment business. 175 The laws of the other Member State, however,
must afford protection to investors equivalent to that afforded
under the FSA.1 76 A certificate issued by the Secretary of the
Department of Trade and IndustryI77 stipulating that the laws of
the other Member State comply with the FSA may be relied
upon as conclusive evidence of such compliance. 178
In addition to the International Stock Exchange 1 79 ("ISE"),
the United Kingdom has an Unlisted Securities Market 0 and an
Alternative Investment Market ("AIM"). as While the ISE pro-
vides for stringent listing requirements182 for foreign and domes-
tic issues,1 8 ' AIM, launched on June 19, 1995,184 offers limited
173. Bloomenthal, supra note 169, at 6A-8. A SRO "must be able and willing to
promote and maintain high standards of integrity and fair dealing in the carrying on of
the investment business." Id.
174. Id.
175. Financial Services Act, 1986, ch. 60, § 31 (Eng.); Bloomenthal, supra note
169, at 6A-5.
176. Financial Services Act, 1986, ch. 60, § 31(3)(a) (Eng.); Bloomenthal, supra
note 169, at 6A-5.
177. Bloomenthal, supra note 169, at 6A-5; see supra note 172 and accompanying
text (discussing role of DTI).
178. Financial Services Act, 1986, ch. 60, § 31(4) (Eng.).
179. Bloomenthal, supra note 169, at 6A-3; see supra note 170 (defining "Interna-
tional Stock Exchange").
180. G.K Morse, United Kingdom, in 10B INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND SE-
CURITIES REGULATION 6-1, 6-17 (1989). The Unlisted Securities Market, organized by
the ISE, was intended to be a transitional market for small companies. Id. at 6-17. The
Unlisted Securities Market, however, is due to close at the end of 1996, replaced by the
Alternative Investment Market. Christopher Price, UK Company News: So Far So Good But
Tests Await, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1995, at 19.
181. Price, supra note 180, at 19. Following the Unlisted Securities Market, the ISE
developed the Alternative Investment Market ("AIM") to handle the issues of young
companies. Id.
182. Morse, supra note 180, at 6-24. The ISE's listing requirements include a mini-
mum market value. Id.
183. AUTHORITY OF THE STOCK EXCHANGE, ADMISSION OF SECURITIES TO LISTING 99,
112 (1973).
184. Price, supra note 180, at 19.
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listing requirements. 85  Although institutional investors 8 6 ini-
tially voiced concern over AIM's lack of listing requirements, the
new market is gaining the investors' confidence. 87
b. Germany
In contrast to those of the United Kingdom, securities mar-
kets in Germany are minimally regulated. 18 8  Although two
pieces of federal securities legislation provide a regulatory
framework,' 89 no federal securities agency exists in Germany.19
Instead, stock exchanges regulate securities issuance and trad-
ing. 91 Germany possesses eight stock exchanges, 192 each with its
own SRO.1 9 3 State agencies supervise the SRO for the stock ex-
change in their jurisdiction.'94 Within this framework, each
SRO manages its own exchange, 95 prescribing rules of conduct
for its members and regulating trading practices.1 96
Prior to the listing of a new issue, the stock exchange con-
ducts an examination of the issuer.1 97 During the examination,
185. Id. AIM requires no minimum market value and no minimum trading rec-
ord. Id.
186. DICrIONARY OF FINANCE, supra note 3, at 202. Institutional investors, includ-
ing mutual funds, pension funds, insurance companies, and college endowment funds
trade large volumes of securities. Id. Concern may be voiced by institutional investors,
rather than individual investors, because individual ownership of securities is a recent
phenomenon. Manning G. Warren III, Global Harmonization of Securities Law: The
Achievements of the European Communities, 31 HARv. INT'L L.J. 185, 194 (1990) [hereinaf-
ter Warren, Global Harmonization]. "Even in the... United Kingdom, as late as 1980
less than three percent of the population owned company shares." Id. Among the
explanations offered are the "insufficient or nonexistent ... liquidity in European se-
curities markets [and] the absence of regulation affording investor protection." Id.
187. Price, supra note 180, at 19.
188. Wegen, supra note 171, at 127. Insider trading, for example, was not prohib-
ited and was an accepted practice. Warrren, Global Harmonization, supra note 186, at
195.
189. Id. at 128. The German Stock Exchange Act (B6rsengesetz) provides the
basis for stock exchanges, while the Stock Exchange Admission Regulation (B6rsenzu-
lassungs-Verordnung) specifies the requirements for listing on a stock exchange. Id.
190. Id.
191. Eberhard H. R6hm, Germany, in IOC INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND
SECURITIEs REGULATION 8C-1, 8C-15 (1991).
192. Id. at 8C-19.
193. Wegen, supra note 171, at 128.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. R6hm, supra note 191, at 8C-16.
197. Id. at 8C-22. German stock exchanges cooperate with those of other EU
Member States and may exempt issuers admitted to listing on another Member State's
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the issuer must meet the listing requirements of the exchange
and make disclosures to investors, including the release of an-
nual reports1 98 and dividend'99 policies. 20  Under the Reform
Act of December 16, 1986,201 stock exchanges must establish sep-
arate markets for unlisted securities.202 These markets facilitate
the issuance of securities by SMEs that cannot meet the listing
requirements of the official exchange.20 3 In addition, an unreg-
ulated trade in unlisted securities exists between banks and br6-
kers.2
04
3. ISD to Enable SMEs to Float Stock/Trade
The European Union, recognizing the importance of SMEs
in the European economy, 20 5 issued the ISD.20 6 In addition, the
European Commission 20 7 ("Commission") supported the efforts
of the European Venture Capital Association 20 1 ("EVCA") in
exchange within the preceding six months from the prospectus requirement. Id. at 8C-
70. A prospectus is a formal written offer to sell securities and includes information an
investor needs to make an informed decision. DICTIONARY OF FINANCE, supra note 3, at
341-42.
198. DICTIONARY OF FINANCE, supra note 3, at 18. An annual report contains the
yearly record of the corporation's financial condition. Id.
199. Id. at 113. Dividends represent distributions of corporate earnings to share-
holders. Id.
200. R6hm, supra note 191, at 8C-22.
201. Id. at 8C-26. The Reform Act of December 16, 1986 amended the German
Stock Exchange Act. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 8C-28. This trading is referred to as "telephone trading" because it
occurs by telephone outside the business hours of the exchanges. Id. The stock ex-
changes do not regulate telephone trading. Id.
205. Financial Problems, supra note 6, COM (93) 528 Final at 7, 7. The Commis-
sion explained that:
The importance of SMEs in Community economic activity is illustrated by...
figures which show that SMEs comprise 99.9% of total enterprises, [and] pro-
vide 70.0% of total employment .... This trend appears to be strengthening,
with SMEs being the principal if not the sole hope of providing major new jobs
.... [T]he economic health of the Community is dependent on a flourishing
small firms sector.
Id. at 7, 7. See Report on Industrial Competitiveness Urges End to Public Monopolies, EUR.
SoC. PoL'v, Jan. 16, 1996, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, CURNWS File (discussing
second Ciampi report of December 12, 1995, on European competitiveness and SMEs'
capacity to add value and employment through innovation and technology).
206. Council Directive No. 93/22/EEC, supra note 4, 0.J. L 141/27 (1993).
207. European Capital Market, supra note 6, COM (95) 498 Final. See EC Treaty,
supra note 1, arts. 155-63 (discussing role of European Commission).
208. EASDAQ supra note 11, at 4.
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launching a pan-European market.209 The EVCA suggested the
creation of the EASD to advise EASDAQ on the organization of
European stock markets for growth companies2 10 and SMEs.
2 11
a. ISD
The European Union recognizes the value of supporting
the development of SMEs. 2 12 For example, the European Union
has studied problems confronting SMEs, including the listing re-
quirements of the national exchanges 213 and the difficulty in ob-
taining capital. 21 4  Among the actions taken in support of
SMEs,2 1 5 the Council of the European Communities ("Council")
has issued the ISD.216 With the enactment of the ISD, the Coun-
cil implemented the regulatory framework for the establishment
of a Pan-European securities market.21 7 Among the investment
services covered by the ISD are: acting as a broker or account
executive 21 8 or transmitting orders,2 1 9 dealing for one's own ac-
209. Id. at 1, 16.
210. DICTIONARY OF FINANCE, supra note 3, at 181. Stocks of growth companies
exhibit faster-than-average gains in earnings and tend to be riskier than average stocks,
partly because they pay little or no dividends to shareholders. Id.
211. EASDAQ, supra note 11, at 4. The EASD's other principal objectives are lob-
bying for favorable legal, financial, and regulatory changes and providing a pan-Euro-
pean forum for participants in the securities industry. Id.
212. Financial Problems, supra note 6, COM (93) 528 Final at 7, 7; see supra notes
6, 204 and accompanying text (evaluating benefits of encouraging SMEs).
213. Maurice Anslow, Europe's New Bourse Stresses Its Links With NASDAQ, VENTURE
CAP. J., May 1995, at 26. To obtain "Official Listing" status on a national exchange, a
company must be approved by the regulatory authority of its own country and have a
three-year trading record. Id. at 26.
214. Small Markets, Big Problems, ECONOMIST, Aug. 20, 1994, at 60 (citing study by
Graham Bannock & Partners, U.K. consulting firm). Although several of the Member
States' national exchanges attempted to establish markets responsive to the needs of
SMEs, these attempts have failed. Id. The study suggests that these failures are due to a
lack of competition for listings, as well as regulatory obstacles that prevent large institu-
tional investors from investing in the equity issues of SMEs. Id.
215. Council Directive No. 90/604/EEC, O.J. L 317/57 (1990) (outlining simpli-
fied financial statement requirements for SMEs); Commission Recommendation No.
94/390/EC, O.J. L 177/1 (1994) (suggesting improvements to tax environment of
SMEs).
216. Council Directive No. 93/22/EEC, supra note 4, OJ. L 141/27 (1993).
217. EASDAQ, supra note 11, at 16-17.
218. DICrIONARY OF FINANCE, supra note 3, at 4. An account executive is a "broker-
age firm employee who advises and handles orders for clients and has the legal powers
of an agent." Id. The terms "account executive" and "registered representative" are
equivalent. Id.
219. Council Directive No. 93/22/EEC, supra note 4, annex, O.J. L 141/27, at 46
(1993).
APPLYING RUDMAN TO EASDAQ
count,2 ° underwriting, 221 and placements.2 2 Market-making is
considered covered by "dealing.
22 3
Rather than attempting to make the investment services reg-
ulatory statutes of the Member States uniform, the European
Union has focused its efforts on the harmonization of minimum
standards for authorization and mutual recognition. 2 4 Provided
an investment services business is authorized to do business in its
home Member State 221 ("Home Member State"), it will be au-
220. Id. annex, O.J. L 141/27, at 46 (1993); see supra note 56 (discussing responsi-
bilities of market makers in OTC market). Market makers deal for their own accounts
because they retain an inventory of securities that they buy and sell to make a market in
that security. WESTON & COPELAND, supra note 9, at 36.
221. Council Directive No. 93/22/EEC, supra note 4, annex, Oj. L 141/27, at 46
(1993). Underwriting is the process by which new securities issues are sold. DICTIONARY
OF FINANCE, supra note 3, at 491-92. Underwriters, usually investment bankers, form a
syndicate to pool the risk of buying a new issue of securities. Id. The underwriters then
resell the securities to the public, either directly or through dealers. Id.
222. Council Directive No. 93/22/EEC, supra note 4, annex, O.J. L 141/27, at 46
(1993). See INTERNATIONAL SURVEY, supra note 25, at 123 (reviewing investment services
covered by ISD). Placements, or private placements, are sales of securities directly to
institutional investors. DICTIONARY OF FINANCE, supra note 3, at 338.
223. Charles Abrams, The Investment Services Directive, in FINANCIAL SERVICES IN THE
NEW EUROPE: THE COMPARATIVE LAW YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 311, 317
(Dennis Campbell and Mickela Moore eds., 1993).
224. Council Directive No. 93/22/EEC, supra note 4, Oj. L 141/27, at 27 (1993).
The "approach adopted is to effect only the essential harmonization necessary and suffi-
cient to secure the mutual recognition of authorization and of prudential supervision
systems." Id. See INTERNATIONAL SURVEY, supra note 25, at 119 (discussing concept of
mutual recognition). The European Commission accepted that regulation of invest-
ment services was necessary. See Eva Lomnicka, The Internal Financial Market and Invest-
ment Services, in EC FINANCIAL MARKET REGULATION AND COMPANY LAw 81-82 (Mads
Andenas and Dr. Stephen Kenyon-Slade eds., 1993) (addressing transition from harmo-
nization to mutual recognition). Mutual recognition has been successfully applied in
the fields of banking and insurance. Van Gerven & Wouter, supra note 1, at 61. A
strategy for determining which policies to harmonize and which to leave to mutual
recognition was developed in 1985. White Paper, supra note 1, COM (85) 310 Final at
19, 65. Harmonization, in effect, would be reserved for essential health and safety
requirements. Id. at 19, 65.
225. Council Directive No. 93/22/EEC, supra note 4, art. 1(6), O.J. L 141/27, at
31 (1993). The ISD defines Home Member State as:
(a) where the investment firm is a natural person, the Member State in which
his head office is situated;
(b) where the investment firm is a legal person, the Member State in which its
registered office is situated or, if under its national law it has no registered
office, the Member State in which its head office is situated;
(c) in the case of a market, the Member State in which the registered office of
the body which provides trading facilities is situated or, if under its national
law it has no registered office, the Member State in which that body's head
office is situated.
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thorized to do business in other Member States ("Host Member
States") .226 This authorization, dubbed a passport, permits ac-
cess to regulated markets. 22 7 A regulated market in one Member
State may not be prevented by another Member State from giv-
ing direct access to firms in the latter Member State through, for
example, screen-based trading.22 8 The ISD, therefore, provides
for equal access to a pan-European securities market, irrespec-
tive of the location of the investor, intermediary, 29 or issuer.230
One of the goals of the ISD is to provide a regulatory frame-
work that protects investors,2 31 and the ISD recognizes that dif-
ferent investors will have differing levels of expertise, requiring
more or less protection.232 The responsibility for supervising an
investment firm remains primarily with the Home Member
State.23  To this end, Home Member States must establish pru-
Id.
226. Id. art. 1(7), O.J. L 141/27, at 32 (1993). The ISD defines Host Member State
as "the Member State in which an investment firm has a branch or provides services."
Id.
227. Id. OJ. L 141/27, at 27 (1993). The ISD explains the passport as the "grant
of a single authorization valid throughout" the European Union. Id. See EASDAQ,
supra note 11, at 16 (discussing concept of ISD passport); INTERNATIONAL SURVEY, supra
note 25, at 119 (explaining ISD passport); Pauline Ashall, The Investment Services Direc-
tive: What Was the Conflict All About?, in EC FINANclAL MARKET REGULATION AND COMPANY
LAw 91, 99 (Mads Andenas & Stephen Kenyon-Slade eds., 1993) (describing passport's
function).
228. Ashall, supra note 227, at 99.
229. DIC'rIONARY OF FINANCE, supra note 3, at 204. An intermediary is empowered
to make investment decisions for others. Id. An intermediary can be a person or an
institution, such as a bank, brokerage firm, or insurance company. Id.
230. EASDAQ supra note 11, at 16. "[F]or purposes of this Directive, the business
of the reception and transmission of orders also includes bringing together two or
more investors thereby bringing about a transaction between those investors." Council
Directive No. 93/22/EEC, supra note 4, OJ. L 141/27, at 28 (1993). An issuer is a legal
entity, such as a corporation, that is empowered to issue a security. DIcrIONARY OF
FINANCE, supra note 3, at 215.
231. Council Directive No. 93/22/EEC, supra note 4, OJ. L 141/27, at 27 (1993).
232. Id. O.J. L 141/27, at 29 (1993). "[O]ne of the objectives of this Directive is to
protect investors; ... therefore [it is] appropriate to take account of the different re-
quirements for protection of various categories of investors and of their levels of profes-
sional expertise ... ." Id.
233. INTERNATIONAL SURVEY, supra note 25, at 128. The Home Member State's re-
sponsibilities include ensuring continued compliance with the initial conditions of au-
thorization, capital requirements, and rules regarding administration, accounting, safe-
keeping, and recordkeeping. Id. at 129-30. In addition, the Home Member State is to
ensure that adequate arrangements have been made for safeguarding the rights of in-
vestors and minimizing the potential conflicts of interest experienced by the firm. Id.
at 130. Home Member States are responsible for "supervising the financial soundness
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dential rules, many of which are intended to protect investors, to
be observed on a continuous basis by investment firms author-
ized by that Member State.23 4 These rules require that invest-
ment firms have adequate controls for the safekeeping of inves-
tors' securities and money, keep adequate records, and are struc-
tured in a manner to minimize the risk of clients' interests being
prejudiced by conflicts of interest of the firm. 35 In addition,
financial services firms must observe rules of conduct that the
Home Member States are required to draw up.236 These rules of
conduct place the protection of the investor at the forefront.237
The ISD was to be implemented by all Member States by Decem-
ber 31, 1995.238 As of January 5, 1996, only four Member States
of an investment firm... pursuant to Council Directive 94/6/EEC of March 15, 1993
on the capital adequacy of investment firms." Council Directive No. 93/22/EEC, supra
note 4, O.J. L 141/27, at 29 (1993).
234. Id. art. 10, O.J. L 141/27, at 36 (1993); Paolo Clarotti, The Completion of the
Internal Financial Market: Current Position and Outlook, in EC FINANCIAL MARKET REGULA-
TION AND COMPANY LAw 1, 10 (Mads Andenas & Dr. Stephen Kenyon-Slade eds., 1993).
The ISD suggests that the safeguarding of investors' securities consists of keeping them
separate from others held, particularly for the investment firm's own account, "except
with the investor's express consent." Council Directive No. 93/22/EEC, supra note 4,
art. 10, OJ. L 141/27, at 36 (1993). In addition, monies must also be safeguarded to
prevent "the investment firm's using investors' funds for its own account." Id. Invest-
ment firms must be structured to minimize "conflicts of interest between the firm and
its clients or between one of its clients and another." Id.
235. Id.; Clarotti, supra note 234, at 10 (discussing prudential rules).
236. Council Directive No. 93/22/EEC, supra note 4, art. 11(1), O.J. L 141/27, at
37 (1993). The rules of conduct must ensure that an investment firm:
-acts honestly and fairly in conducting it business activities in the best inter-
ests of its clients and the integrity of the market,
-acts with due skill, care and diligence, in the best interests of its clients and
the integrity of the market....
-- seeks from its clients information regarding their financial situations, invest-
ment experience and objectives as regards the services requested,
-makes adequate disclosure of relevant material information in its dealings
with its clients,
-tries to avoid conflicts of interest and, when they cannot be avoided, ensures
that its clients are fairly treated, and
---complies with all regulatory requirements applicable to the conduct of its
business activities so as to promote the best interests of its clients and the
integrity of the market.
Id.
237. Id. See Ashall, supra note 227, at 98 (describing responsibilities of firms to
distinguish between skills and knowledge of customers).
238. Council Directive No. 93/22/EEC, supra note 4, art. 31, OJ. L 141/27, at 45
(1993). Member states were to adopt the ISD byJuly 1, 1995 and effectuate the provi-
sions of the ISD by December 31, 1995. Id.
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had implemented fully the ISD.23 9
Host Member States may also regulate investment firms do-
ing business within their borders, within the guidelines of the
ISD. 24" For example, the ISD permits the Host Member States to
require compliance reporting241 and to impose their own rules
of conduct. 242 In addition, the ISD expressly permits Member
States to impose stricter authorization standards on their home
authorized enterprises.243
b. Role of the EVCA
With the support of the Commission, the EVCA sought to
launch a pan-European market.244  In early 1994, the EVCA
formed a working group to identify practical solutions to the
239. Financial Services: Investment Services and Capital Adequacy Rules in Force -Almost,
EUR. REP., Jan. 5, 1996, available in WESTLAW, Euronews Database [hereinafter Finan-
cial Services]. Sweden, Ireland, the United Kingdom, and France have implemented
fully the ISD. Id.; World Watch: International Business, LA TIMES,Jan. 4, 1996, at 4. Italy
is expected to pass conforming legislation imminently, while Germany, Belgium, and
the Netherlands have implemented partially the ISD. Financial Services, supra. Full im-
plementation during the first half of 1996 is anticipated in Belgium, Denmark, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, and Finland, but Germany, Greece, and
Spain are expected not to fully implement the ISD until 1997. Id.
240. INTERNATIONAL SURVEY, supra note 25, at 133-34; Van Gerven & Wouters,
supra note 1, at 63. The Host Member States may act to prevent or punish irregularities
within their State that are contrary to the legal rules they have adopted "in the interest
of the general good." Council Directive No. 93/22/EEC, supra note 4, art. 19, 1 6, O.J.
L 141/27, at 40 (1993). Advertisements by investment firms are permitted provided
their form and content comply with any rules adopted in the interest of the general
good. Id. "In the interest of the general good" has been interpreted as a public policy
standard that incorporates the protection of consumers of investment services, to the
extent that they require such protection. Van Gerven & Wouters, supra note 1, at 65.
In addition, public policy objectives may include aspects of financial market regulation,
such as stability of the financial system. Id.
241. Council Directive No. 93/22/EEC, supra note 4, art. 19, 2, O.J. L 141/27, at
40 (1993). In formulating compliance reporting requirements:
Host Member States may require investment firms carrying on business within
their territories under the freedom to provide services to provide the informa-
tion necessary for the monitoring of their compliance with the standards set
by the host Member State ... although those requirements may not be more
stringent than those the same Member State imposes on established firms ....
Id.
242. INTERNATIONAL SURVEY, supra note 25, at 133.
243. Council Directive No. 93/22/EEC, supra note 4, art. 20, 5, O.J. L 141/27, at
41 (1993). It is unlikely, however, that this will occur, because firms authorized by
other Member States after the adoption of the ISD will be competing with the home
authorized domestic firms. Lomnicka, supra note 224, at 81, 86.
244. EASDAQ, supra note 11, at 1.
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problems SMEs faced in raising capital. 245 The working group
met in June 199421 to recommend the creation of an organiza-
tion of market professionals to support and sponsor equity in-
vestment.247 In response to the working group's recommenda-
tion, the European Association of Securities Dealers2 48 ("EASD")
emerged in November 1994.249 Modelling itself on the NASD,
the EASD signifies a non-profit entity regulating the for-profit
EASDAQ market.250
c. EASD
The principal objectives of the EASD include advising EAS-
DAQ on the organization of European stock markets for growth
companies2 t and SMEs. 212 The EASD intends to act as a pan--
European network of investment services providers. 253  The
EASD members, holding passports issued under the ISD, will be
able to coexist on a single regulated securities market.25 4 The
EASD will create and support the EASDAQ market. 255
d. EASDAQ
Further discussions of the EVCA working group led to the
EASDAQ initiative. 256 By March 1995, the concept of EASDAQ
245. European Capital Market, supra note 6, COM (95) 498 Final at 7, 17. Ven-
ture capital funds are in a unique position to experience the shortage of capital avail-
able to SMEs because they often invest in companies during the early stages of growth.
Financial Problems, supra note 6, COM (93) 528 Final at 19-20, 33. Because the
funds have a limited time horizon, and the funds' investors expect some level of liquid-
ity, funds need to realize their investments after a period of time. Id. at 19, 33.
246. European Capital Market, supra note 6, COM (95) 498 Final at 7, 18.
247. EASDAQ supra note 11, at 4. Equity investments represent ownership inter-
est held by shareholders in a corporation. DICTIONARY OF FINANCE, supra note 3, at 127.
248. EASDAQ supra note 11, at 4.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 4, 8. As of November 1995, the EASD had 60 members, representing
investment banks, stockbrokers, and market makers from Europe and the United
States. Id. at 4.
251. DICTIONARY OF FINANCE, supra note 3, at 181. Growth stocks exhibit faster-
than-average gains in earnings and tend to be riskier than average stocks, pardy because
they pay little or no dividends to shareholders. Id.
252. EASDAQ supra note 11, at 4. The EASD's other principal objectives are lob-
bying for favorable legal, financial, and regulatory changes, and providing a pan-Euro-
pean forum for participants in the securities industry. Id.
253. Id. at 8.
254. Id. at 16-17.
255. European Capital Market, supra note 6, COM (95) 498 Final at 8-9, 22-23.
256. EASDAQ, supra note 11, at 5.
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appeared to be an achievable goal and the EASD initiated the
raising of capital.25 7 Within eight weeks, EASD reached its target
financing of ECU 1 million.258
EASDAQ's mission is to establish and operate a pan-Euro-
pean, regulated screen-based stock market. 259 In May 1995, EAS-
DAQ incorporated in Belgium 260 with the goal of providing a
liquid,2 16 1 efficient, and fair market.262 EASDAQ expects to be-
come operational in the second half of 1996.65 As of November
1995, EASDAQ was discussing with the Belgian Commission for
Banking and Finance264 ("CBF") its formal application for recog-
nition as a regulated stock market.2 65 Brokers and dealers from
all the Member States will be eligible to join the market, pro-
vided they obtain a passport from their Home Member State.2 6 6
257. Id.
258. Id. Estimates of the expected financing required over the next few years have
ranged as high as ECU 10 million. See Anslow, supra note 213, at 26 (stating that EAS-
DAQ will require ECU10 million to become operational, with expected breakeven
point in EASDAQ's fourth year).
259. EASDAQ supra note 11, at 1.
260. E. U. EASDAQ -2-: To be Located in Belgium, Dow JONEs NEws SERV., Feb. 21,
1996, available in WESTLAW, Euronews Database [hereinafter E.U. EASDAQ 2].
Belgium was selected because the local authorities accept documents in four languages,
perceptions of the nation as politically neutral, Belgium's early adoption of the ISD,
and the perception that the Belgian Commission for Banking and Finance ("CBF") is
one of the strictest regulatory authorities. Id.
261. DICTIONARY OF FINANCE, supra note 3, at 233-34. Liquidity is a characteristic of
a security with enough units outstanding that trades can occur without a substantial
impact on price. Id. A liquid assets is one that can easily be converted into cash. Id.
262. EASDAQ, supra note 11, at 1.
263. Id. See Charlene Lee, Heard in Paris: New Market in France Has Risk, Potential,
WALL ST. J. EUR., Feb. 22, 1996, at 10 (stating expected start date of September 1996).
264. EASDAQ, supra note 11, at 17. The CBF is the primary regulatory agency in
Belgium for securities law. Andr6 Bruyneel & Jan Peeters, Belgium, in INTERNATIONAL
SECURITIES LAw 19, 20 (1992). The CBF's responsibilities include bank regulation, su-
pervision of the primary market, regulation of all financial intermediaries, and, to a
certain extent, supervision of the secondary market. Id. EASDAQ must obtain the ap-
proval of the CBF because it chose to organize in Belgium and, therefore, requires
recognition by the CBF as a regulated stock market. EASDAQ, supra note 11, at 2.
265. EASDAQ supra note 11, at 2. Prior to filing an application, the governing
structure must be in place, the technical platform must be specified, the Rule-book for
Members must be written, and the capital commitments to take EASDAQ to break-even
must be raised. Id. Upon approval of the application, EASDAQ will then be considered
a regulated securities market for the purposes of the ISD. Id. at 17. In March 1996
EASDAQ raised sufficient capital to gain the CBF's recognition as a regulated market.
Richard Gourlay, EASDAQ Paves the Way for September Launch: Planned Europe-Wide Stock
Market Passes Capital Threshold, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1996, at 21.
266. EASDAQ supra note 11, at 17.
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EASDAQ anticipates that quotations267 will be transmitted from
companies in all Member States.268
As of November 1995, EASDAQ consisted of forty-three
shareholders269 and a Board of Directors270 ("EASDAQ Board")
of seventeen individuals.271 EASDAQ intends for the EASDAQ
Board to represent the interests of all parties involved in the suc-
cess of the market.272 These constituencies include: sharehold-
ers, 273 EASD members, 274 quoted companies, and investors. 275
Of the seventeen board members, eight are shareholders of EAS-
DAQ and one is the President of EASDAQ.276 Ten of the seven-
teen members either are members of the EASD or have an affili-
ate that is a member of the EASD.2 77
EASDAQ's governing structure has not yet been estab-
lished. 278  The proposed structure encompasses the CBF as the
primary regulatory authority, the EASDAQ Board, the EASDAQ
market authority, 2 79 and an independent international appeal
body.2 0 The CBF's responsibilities will entail reviewing and ap-
267. Id. at 17-18. Quotes will be transmitted using a computer-based trading sys-
tem and brokers will be able to execute trades. Id. at 18. Companies with less than
three years' trading history will be able to gain admission to EASDAQ. Id. It remains a
question, however, whether European institutional investors will invest in unlisted is-
sues. Anslow, supra note 213, at 26.
268. EASDAO, supra note 11, at 17-18.
269. Id. at 6. The 43 shareholders, from 10 countries, including the United States,
are investment banks, brokers, venture capital funds, and Nasdaq. Id.
270. Id. at 7, 17. Members of the EASDAQ Board include the President of EAS-
DAQ a representative of Nasdaq, and representatives from various venture capital and
brokerage firms. Id. at 7.
271. Id. at 7.
272. Id. The EASDAQ Board "must be a powerful, effective and highly credible
body, adding to the successful development of the market and representing all stake-
holders." Id.
273. Id. at 6. The commitment of over ECUl million came from the EASDAQ
shareholders. Id.
274. Id. at App. 1.
275. Id. at 7.
276. Id. at 6-7.
277. Id. at 7. Public representatives do not constitute a majority of the EASDAQ
Board. Id.
278. Id. at 17. As of November 1995, EASDAQ and EASD were still discussing the
potential governing structure of the market with the appropriate regulatory authorities.
Id.
279. Id. The EASDAQ market authority will consist of senior EASDAQ executives.
Id.
280. Id. EASDAQ is in the process of defining this independent international ap-
peal body. Id.
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proving the rules and procedures of the market, ensuring that
EASDAQ personnel and members follow the rules and proce-
dures, and approving the appointments of key EASDAQ execu-
tives by the EASDAQ Board.281 The EASDAQ Board will formu-
late and review the rules and procedures of the market and ap-
point the key EASDAQ personnel. 8 2 The EASDAQ market
authority, consisting of senior EASDAQ executives, will serve as
the administrative and operational staff of the market.2 3 The
independent appeal body will be available to review certain deci-
sions made by EASDAQ executives, such as applications for
membership in the market and admission of securities for trad-
ing.284 EASDAQ intends to be a highly regulated market be-
cause it attributes the past failures of minimally-regulated secon-
dary markets to their failure to gain the confidence of inves-
tors.2
85
In October 1995, the International Securities Market Associ-
ation 286 ("ISMA") announced its agreement to build the EAS-
DAQ trading system 287 to operate beside its own trade confirma-
tion system ("TRAX") .288 Like Nasdaq, the ISMA-developed sys-
tem will disseminate through a computer network the price
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 14. Inclusion requirements will be similar to those set by Nasdaq. Id.;
see supra note 122 and accompanying text (discussing Nasdaq inclusion requirements);
E.U./EASDAQ -3: To Be Strictly Regulated, Dow JONES INT'L NEWS SERV., Feb. 21, 1996,
available in WESTIAW, Euronews Database (quoting EASDAQ's director, Pickles, com-
menting that institutional investors require confidence provided by highly regulated
market). Pickles' statements are confirmed by institutional investors' apprehension of
the light regulation of AIM, the ISE's market for young companies. Price, supra note
180, at 19; see supra notes 181-87 and accompanying text (discussing establishment of
AIM).
286. EASDAQ, supra note 11, at 2. See generally Europe Ready for Opening of New
Bourses in 1996, EUR. VENTURE CAP. J., Jan. 1, 1996, available in WESTLAW, Euronews
Database [hereinafter Europe Ready] ("ISMA is a self-regulatory organisation which had
been founded in 1989 as the Association of International Bond Dealers to provide sta-
bility for the expanding Eurobond market. Currently ISMA, which had changed its
name in 1992, has over 860 member firms from 48 countries.").
287. EASDAQ, supra note 11, at 18.
288. Id. at 2. "TRAX" is ISMA's trade confirmation and tracking system and is
connected to over 290 subscribers worldwide. Id. TRAX, designed for the interna-
tional securities market, has been tailored to accept all types of securities, including
internationally traded stocks. The European Stock Market - A Step Closer, ISMA Press Re-
lease, Oct. 30, 1995, reprinted in EASDAQ, supra note 11, at App. 3.
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quotations of market makers.2 8 9 Trades will be executed over
the telephone 290 and must be reported within three minutes on
the computer network.29 1 Quotes entered on the computer net-
work by market makers will be binding and will be available to all
EASDAQ members simultaneously. 29 2 EASDAQ will own the in-
tellectual property rights to the trading system and will have the
exclusive use of it.293 ISMA will operate the trading system on
behalf of EASDAQ for an initial period of five years.294
The EASDAQ anticipates rapid growth.295 One study identi-
fied a total of 475 companies seeking a stock market listing in
the next three years.296 Nearly half of the companies showed
interest in listing with EASDAQ.29 7 In another survey, two-thirds
of biotechnology companies queried chose EASDAQ as their
first choice for raising equity financing.298 In addition, EASDAQ
intends to invite qualifying European companies currently listed
on Nasdaq to apply for an EASDAQ listing.299
Nasdaq currently contributes to the establishment of EAS-
DAQ.30 Nasdaq is a shareholder of EASDAQ has a representa-
tive on the board of EASDAQ and is providing additional assist-
ance.3"1 EASDAQ expects that many securities will seek dual list-
ings on EASDAQ and Nasdaq. °2 In addition, EASDAQ plans to
duplicate Nasdaq's market maker structure, believing that the
289. EASDAQ supra note 11, at 18.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 2.
294. Id. at 18.
295. Id. at 1. "EASDAQ has made estimates of worst and best case scenarios, the
median of which is that there will be 50 companies admitted to trading after one year of
operation, 200 companies after three years and 500 companies after five years." Id.
296. Id. at 12-13. The study looked at firms in France, the Netherlands, Spain, and
the United Kingdom. Id. at 12; Small, but not yet Beautiful, ECONoMIST, Feb. 25, 1995, at
80.
297. Id. at 13.
298. Id.
299. Id. There are currently 74 qualifying European companies. Id.
300. Id. at 1.
301. Id. at 1-2, 18. EASDAQ will not use the same trading system as Nasdaq, how-
ever, because it is expected to be too complex for the smaller number of firms to be
quoted. Id. at 18; see supra notes 286-94 and accompanying text (describing system to
be developed by ISMA).
302. EASDAQ supra note 11, at 1, 11. The advantages to companies obtaining
such a dual listing include the extension of trading hours from 7 to 12. Id. at 11.
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competition between market makers will best serve investors. 3
II. THE RUDMAN REPORT
The Select Committee concluded that the NASD's govern-
ance structure failed to adapt to the growth and evolution of
Nasdaq.3 °4 Evaluations of the self-regulatory structure of securi-
ties markets, including the Rudman Report, have ranged from
calls for greater reliance on the free market30 5 to calls for greater
intervention by the Federal Government. 0 6 The Select Commit-
tee, while not evaluating the self-regulatory system governing the
securities industry, was generally supportive of the SRO for-
mat.307 The Select Committee determined that Nasdaq should
be governed by an entity independent of that regulating the bro-
ker-dealer industry.3 08
A. Overview of the Rudman Report and its Recommendations
The Select Committee determined that the NASD's existing
governance structure blurs the distinction between its duty to
regulate the broker-dealer profession and its duty to oversee Nas-
daq." 9 The Rudman Report recommends the creation of a new,
303. Id. at 10. Like Nasdaq, EASDAQ also plans to require two market makers for
an issue to be listed. Id.; see supra note 119 and accompanying text (referring to Nasdaq
inclusion requirements).
304. RUDMAN REPORT, supra note 9, at C-21.
305. George J. Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities Markets, 37 J. Bus. U. CHI.
117, 118 (1964).
306. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protec-
tion of Investors, 70 VA. L. REv. 669, 672-73 (1984) [hereinafter Mandatory Disclosure].
307. RUDMAN REPORT, supra note 9, at 1-5, R-3. Addressing the extent to which
change in the governance structure of Nasdaq was required, the Select Committee
stated that:
A divorce (as opposed to some separation) [between the NASD and Nasdaq]
would be undesirable.., because it would remove the regulator of the broker-
dealer profession entirely from the dealer market. This would sacrifice a key
benefit of the self-regulatory system, which links industry expertise with indus-
try regulation, so that each is informed and enhanced by the other.
Id. at C-9.
308. Id. at C-9; see supra note 41 and accompanying text (defining broker-dealer
profession); see supra note 120 (defining dealer); see supra note 219 (defining transmis-
sion of orders, as used in ISD).
309. RUDMAN REPORT, supra note 9, at C-21. Prior to the Rudman Report, disci-
pline and enforcement were conducted as peer reviews. The Nightly Business Report
(Community Television Foundation of South Florida, Inc. broadcast, Sept. 19, 1995)
(interviewing former Senator Rudman). "We believe the time has come for this market
... to have a regularized series of hearings done in a professional manner." Id.
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independent subsidiary of the NASD.3"' This new entity will be
responsible for regulating member firms,31 I assuring increased
public representation on the NASD Board and Nasdaq Board, 1 2
and giving greater responsibility to the professional staffs of the
NASD and its subsidiaries. 313 The recommendations, therefore,
suggest changes to the current governance structure to minimize
potential conflicts of interest 31 4 and to dilute the power of the
NASD Board, 1 5 with the goal of bolstering investors' confidence
in the NASD's policies without defeating the self-regulatory
scheme.3
16
1. NASDR
The Rudman Report advocates that regulation of the bro-
ker-dealer profession should be performed independent of the
regulation of Nasdaq. 1 7 It recommends that this be accom-
plished by the creation of NASD Regulation, Inc. 18 ("NASDR"),
an independent operating subsidiary of the NASD. 3 19  The
310. RUDMAN REPORT, supra note 9, at C-23.
311. Id.
312. Id. at C-24.
313. Id. at C-27.
314. Id. at C-21. The NASD, for example, owns Nasdaq's trading systems and must
regulate the competing systems owned by NASD members. Id.
315. Id. at C-21-C-22. "[T]he governing Board charged with regulating the
NASD's member firms should be separate and independent from the governing Board
responsible for overseeing the Nasdaq market." Id. at C-22.
316. Id. at C-21.
317. Id. at C-22.
318. Id. at C-23, R-12-R-14. The Select Committee recommended the creation of
NASDR to direct the regulation of the broker-dealer profession. Id. at C-23. In particu-
lar, NASDR would establish Rules of Fair Practice for the broker-dealer profession, ad-
minister the discipline and enforcement procedures, administer an Office of Profes-
sional Hearing Officers, conduct arbitrations, oversee all district offices, and establish
its own annual budget and strategic plan. Id. at R-12.
319. Id. at C-23. The NASDR was expected to begin operation in the first quarter
of 1996. Mary Schapiro Inches Toward the Private Sector, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Jan.
1996, at 12 [hereinafter Mary Schapiro]. The NASD formed the NASDR in November
1995 and named Mary Schapiro the first head of NASDR. Elizabeth Macdonald, Sic
'Em, WORTH, May 1996, at 90. The NASD did not appoint the NASDR Board members,
however, until April 1, 1996. Deborah Lohse, NASD Names 23 Governors to Boards in
Move Boosting Investor Advocates, WALL ST. J., Apr. 2, 1996, at B9 [hereinafter Lohse,
NASD Names Governors]. Ms. Schapiro, formerly chair of the Commodity Futures Trad-
ing Commission and a commissioner of the SEC, hopes that the new structure will truly
separate regulation from the remainder of the business. Mary Schapiro, supra, at 12;
Deborah Lohse, New Top Cop at the NASD Talks Tough, WALL ST.J., Mar. 25, 1996, at Cl
[hereinafter Lohse, New Top Cop]. Ms. Schapiro states that instituting any changes re-
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NASDR's mandate is to regulate the broker-dealer profession.320
Enforcement of the NASD's Rules of Fair Practice and federal
securities laws, the primary concerns of the NASDR Board,2
would become independent of responsibility for Nasdaq.322 The
NASDR Board and the Nasdaq Board, however, would remain
linked through their common parent, the NASD, to benefit
from the SRO format.323
The NASD Board would retain ultimate responsibility for
policy-making and oversight as the parent entity and the statu-
tory SRO.3 24 The Rudman Report urges that the NASD Board
grant substantial deference to the Nasdaq Board and the NASDR
Board.12' Board members would be selected by each entity's re-
spective nominating committee. 2 6 Nominating committees
would be composed equally of individuals affiliated with NASD
member firms and members of the public. 27
2. Public Representation
The Rudman Report recommends increased public repre-
sentation in order to bolster confidence in the NASD's policies
without defeating the self-regulatory scheme.328 In particular,
the Nasdaq Board and the NASDR Board each would have fifty
percent public membership. 29 The NASD Board would have a
quired by the SEC upon the completion of its investigation of the NASD will be a prior-
ity. Lohse, New Top Cop, supra, at Cl; see supra note 135 (discussing SEC's investigation
of NASD).
320. RUDMAN REPORT, supra note 9, at C-23. "[Olur focus is clear; it's regula-
tion.... I care about market development the way any investor would, but ... it won't
take one scintilla of my attention." Macdonald, supra note 319, at 90 (quoting Mary
Schapiro, first NASDR chief).
321. RUDMAN REPORT, supra note 9, at R-13-R-14. See RUDMAN EXHIBITS, supra note
97, at D (proposing composition of NASDR Board).
322. RUDMAN REPORT, supra note 9, at R-13-R-14.
323. Id. at R-8-R-9. "[T] he NASD would have ultimate responsibility for the policy,
rulemaking and regulatory matters entrusted to [a SRO under the 1934 Act]." Id. at R-
8.
324. Id. at C-24.
325. Id. The NASDR and Nasdaq Boards, for example, would select their own
Chief Executive Officers ("CEOs"). Id. The NASD Board would have authority to re-
ject or dismiss such CEOs. Id. It would be expected, however, that such authority
would be exercised only in exceptional circumstances. Id.
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id. at C-21. Since NASD members will continue to be fairly represented, the
NASD's status as a SRO would continue. Id.
329. Id. at C-22. The Rudman Report suggests that public members should not be
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majority of public members. 330 The Rudman Report suggests
that any governing bodies with substantial policy-making or over-
sight authority have strong public representation.331 In addi-
tion, the Select Committee approved the NASD's decision to es-
tablish, within Nasdaq, an office devoted to the representation of
the interests of the individual investor in policy-making and reg-
ulation.33
3. Independent Professional Staff
In addition to the separation of the governing boards, the
Rudman Report recommends that the professional staffs of the
boards be independent from one another.33 3 Because the
boards will consist of a greater number of public representatives,
the professional staffs will be expected to advise the boards on
technical matters.334 Professional staffs will also be required to
consult with all relevant constituencies regarding policy develop-
ment and rule-making.
3 3 5
While the narrowing of the NASD Board's operating re-
sponsibilities will require a relatively small professional staff,
3 6
the Select Committee recommended the creation of the Office
of Internal Review. 3 7 The Office of Internal Review would con.-
duct regular internal audits338 of the operations of the NASD
affiliated with NASD member firms, but should have "sufficient knowledge, experience
and interest in the securities industry or markets to play a meaningful role in govern.-
ance, and should represent a wide spectrum of skills and interests." Id. at C-22, C-23.
The Select Committee proposes that the Nasdaq Board be composed of the CEO of
Nasdaq, eight public members, four "market maker" representatives, and four industry
representatives. RUDMAN EXHIBrrs, supra note 97, at E. The CEO of the NASD would
be a non-voting member of the Nasdaq Board. Id. The NASDR Board would be com-
posed of the CEO of the NASDR, 11 representatives of member firms elected by the
NASD Districts, 3 at-large industry representatives, and 14 public members. Id. Again,
the CEO of the NASD would be a non-voting board member. Id.
330. RUDMAN REPORT, supra note 9, at C-22.
331. Id.
332. Id. at R-30. The NASD's Issuer Affairs Committee endorses many of the rec..
ommendations of the Rudman Report and favors an attempt to better address the
needs of individual investors. DeMott, supra note 100, at 12.
333. RUDMAN REPORT, supra note 9, at C-22.
334. Id. at R-11.
335. Id.
336. Id. at R-17.
337. Id. at R-27.
338. Id. at C-26, R-27. In effect, the Office of Internal Review would audit the
internal operations and procedures of the NASD and its subsidiaries. Id. "A principle
goal of internal audits is to investigate and appraise the effectiveness with which the
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and its subsidiaries."3 9 The Office of Internal Review would also
serve as an ombudsman for receiving and addressing concerns
and complaints from any source regarding any aspect of the
NASD, Nasdaq, or the NASDR.34 o To ensure its independence,
the Office of Internal Review would be administered by the
NASD Board and NASD President, jointly.341
B. Criticisms of the Rudman Report
Critical responses to the Rudman Report, and existing se-
curities regulation in general, diverge from one another because
of disagreements over the adequacy of existing regulation. 42
Some critics, for example, contend that federal regulation of se-
curities markets is unnecessary because government should not
interfere in the operation of the free market.343 In addition,
critics have disagreed over inadequacies in the solutions offered
by the Rudman Report.344 While some critics suggest that the
Select Committee's efforts were a ploy by the NASD to limit fu-
ture governmental regulation, 345 others contend that more ex-
treme measures are required if Nasdaq is to be a fair and effi-
cient market. 346
1. Free Market Argument
While Congress has dismantled or diminished many of the
regulatory programs of the 1930'S, 34 7 the 1933 Act and the 1934
Act have maintained their support as well as their structure. 48
various organizational units of the [entity] are carrying out their assigned functions."
0. RAY WHITTINGTON & KURT PANY, PRINCIPLES OF AUDITING 11 (11th ed. 1995).
339. RUDMAN REPORT, supra note 9, at R-27.
340. Id.
341. Id. at R-28.
342. See Stigler, supra note 305, at 117 (arguing that creation of SEC has been of
little benefit to investors); cf Mandatory Disclosure, supra note 306, at 669 (finding justi-
fication for federal securities laws).
343. Stigler, supra note 305, at 120-24.
344. See Schroeder, supra note 7, at 102 (suggesting NASD's appointment of Select
Committee was intended to prevent additional governmental regulation);
345. Schroeder, supra note 8, at 102.
346. Patrick J. Healy, Nasdaq Reform: Take Another Look, CFO, Mar. 1996, at 10;
Deborah Lohse, Critic to Nasdaq: Sell Thyself to the Public, WALL ST. J., Apr. 15, 1996, at
Al IA [hereinafter Lohse, Critic to Nasdaq]; see supra note 7 and accompanying text (ex-
amining criticisms of NASD's oversight of Nasdaq).
347. Mandatory Disclosure, supra note 306, at 669. Communications and transporta-
tion, for example, have been deregulated in recent years. Id.
348. Id.
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The SEC also has retained its political support.349 Some com-
mentators question, however, the extent to which federal regula-
tion of securities markets is economically efficient.5 0 For exam-
ple, a 1963 Report,3 51 resulting from the review of the securities
markets and the SEC, suggested that the existence of any fraud
justified additional regulation of the securities markets.3 52 In re-
sponse, however, a commentator conducted a study to deter-
mine how investors fared before and after the creation of the
SEC.35 3 The study concluded that investors gained little finan-
cially from the creation of the SEC.3 54
2. Rudman Report is Ineffectual
Criticisms of the potential effectiveness of the Rudman Re-
port are twofold.355 Some commentators suggest that the Rud-
man Report fails to recommend substantive changes because the
Select Committee represents the NASD's efforts to avoid greater
349. Stigler, supra note 305, at 117.
350. Mandatory Disclosure, supra note 306, at 670 (noting that "[f] raud was unlawful
in every state in 1933; we did not need a federal law to penalize lying and deceit"). The
authors believe the justification for federal securities laws lies in the efficiencies in their
enforcement compared with the enforcement of state securities laws, particularly since
many new issues are sold interstate. Id. at 679.
351. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL STUDY OF THE
SECURITIES MARKETS, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963) [hereinafter 1963
SPECIAL STUDY].
352. Stigler, supra note 305, at 119. The Report of the Special Study of the Securi-
ties Market stated that "[t]here is no evidence that these [improper selling] practices
are typical of how business is conducted by most of the larger firms, but regardless of
their frequency they represent problems too important to be ignored." 1963 SPECIAL
STUDY, supra note 351, pt. 1, at 268. "The mere fact that there have been any losses at
all is sufficient reason to consider whether there are further adjustments that should be
made for the protection of investors." Id. at 400.
353. Stigler, supra note 305, at 120-21.
354. Id. at 121. The most significant difference between the 1920's and the 1950's
was the extent to which the issuance of new stocks had decreased. Id. at 122. The
author concluded that regulation by the SEC succeeded in decreasing the number of
new issues. Id. The decrease in issues was not limited to poor investments, however, as
shown by the relative consistency in the stock prices. Id. See Bill Barnhart, Competition
the Answer to Nasdaq 'Sins, CHIC. TRIB., Sept. 18, 1995, at § 3(1) (citing president of
Arizona Stock Exchange's view that SEC is to blame for inequities in operation of Nas-
daq). Instead of trying to create a national market system the SEC should be con-
cerned with fostering competition between the securities markets. Id.; see supra note
119 (explaining NMS).
355. See Schroeder, supra note 7, at 102 (suggesting NASD used Select Committee
to avoid additional government regulation); Knight, supra note 7, at HI (suggesting
self-regulation is ineffective).
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governmental regulation.356 Other commentators suggest that
self-regulation's inherent conflicts of interest necessitate in-
creased governmental regulation of securities markets. 357
a. Rudman Report Fails to Recommend Substantive Changes
The NASD admits to its efforts to limit governmental regula-
tion of the securities industry. 358 Some critics suggest that the
NASD's appointment of the Select Committee illustrated an at-
tempt to forestall reforms by the SEC or Congress. 3 59 Other crit-
ics allege that the NASD inadequately fulfilled its regulatory obli-
gations by not developing fully a new computer system used to
analyze suspicious trading until the government launched its in-
vestigations.360
b. Replace Self-Regulatory Structure with Increased
Governmental Regulation
Although self-regulation of U.S. securities markets has ex-
isted since the passage of the 1934 Act,361 small market makers,
investors, and academics have called for the dissolution of the
self-regulatory system.362 These proponents argue that only gov-
ernment action will reform Nasdaq. 363 Critics314 cite the 0ng0-
356. Schroeder, supra note 7, at 102.
357. Knight, supra note 7, at Hi; see supra note 7 and accompanying text (review-
ing public criticisms of NASD's oversight of Nasdaq).
358. NASD, supra note 72, at 115. "The [NASD] has been successful in many in-
stances in preventing the enactment of unnecessary or undesirable regulatory legisla-
tion proposed by the SEC." Id.
359. Schroeder, supra note 7, at 102. "It's pretty clear that the [Rudman Report] is
intended to mollify the SEC and even the Justice Department, and allow self-regulation
to continue." Dominic Bencivenga, Rudman Report; NASD Action Could Ease Regulators'
Concerns, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 5, 1995, at 5 (quoting Lester Brickman, professor at Benjamin N.
Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University Law School). Others have interpreted the
appointment of the Select Committee as a tacit admission that change is warranted.
Knight, supra note 7, at HI.
360. William Power, Nasdaq Police Have 'Radar' Guns Drawn, WALL ST. J., Dec. 18,
1995, at C1.
361. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3; see supra note 16 (outlining delegation of SEC's authority
to SROs).
362. Inside Nasdaq, Part 1, supra note 7, at 1; see supra note 7 (reviewing public
criticisms of NASD's oversight of Nasdaq).
363. Knight, supra note 7, at H1.
364. See Christie & Schultz, supra note 136, at 1814 (finding "implicit agreement
among market makers to avoid using odd-eighths in quoting bid and ask prices and that
a large number of market makers per stock is not necessarily synonymous with competi-
tion"). Other critics include small market makers, who find large market makers dis-
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ing investigations of the NASD by the Department of Justice36
and the SEC as indicative of the problems of self-regulation. 66
Another critic contends that the NASD would be better able to
govern Nasdaq if it sold the market to the public.
36 7
C. Support/Praise for the Rudman Report Approach
Although the Maloney Act3 68 established the self-regulatory
framework for the OTC market,3 69 Senator Maloney voiced con-
cern about unnecessary regulation of the securities markets. 70
He promoted the SRO format as a form of cooperative regula-
tion, in which the industry would take the lead.3 7 1 The SEC also
couraging changes in the spread. Knight, supra note 7, at H1. When one small market
maker reduced the spread on Intel Corporation, for example, a large market maker
sent a message over the computer lines: "Pathetic." Inside Nasdaq, Part 1, supra note 7,
at 1. "The big issue is whether a [SRO] can regulate its members." Knight, supra note
7, at HI (quoting Harold Bradley, chief stock trader for Twentieth Century mutual
fund family, which invests billions of dollars in stocks traded on Nasdaq).
365. BLACK'S L-Aw DICTIONARY 864 (6th ed. 1990). An executive department of the
Federal Government, the Department ofJustice represents the Federal Government in
legal matters, enforces federal laws, and furnishes legal counsel in federal cases. Id.
366. Probe Launched, supra note 135, at 1; see supra note 135 and accompanying text
(discussing matters under investigation by Department of Justice and SEC). EASDAQ
officials do not appear overly concerned by Nasdaq's regulatory problems. Josh Martin,
USA: Success Despite Scandals, EUROMONEY, Dec. 21, 1995, at 14. They stress the impor..
tance of Nasdaq's record in bringing small, growth-oriented companies to market. Id.
367. Healy, supra note 346, at 10. While "segregation of the market and regulator),
functions . . . would unquestionably be an improvement over the status quo[,] . . . a
more efficient way to reform Nasdaq [is to] sell it." Id. Mr. Healy, the NASD's former
director of financial policy and strategy, acknowledges that the sale of Nasdaq addresses
only the governance issues confronted in the Rudman Report. Id.; Lohse, Critic to Nas-
daq, supra note 346, at A11A. The sale of Nasdaq, therefore, would not necessarily
resolve the issues being investigated by the Department of Justice or the SEC. Healy,
supra note 346, at 10; see supra note 135 (discussing SEC and Department of Justice
investigations).
368. Maloney Act of 1938, 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1994); see supra note 72 and accompa.-
nying text (describing genesis of Maloney Act).
369. NASD, supra note 72, at 109; see supra note 72 and accompanying text (review..
ing legislative history of Maloney Act).
370. U.S. Senator Francis Maloney, Radio Address (Feb. 25, 1938), in 83 App. TO
THE CONG. REc. 789, 790 (1938). "Because of the tremendous amount of regulation
proposed and imposed in these few years, I approached this subject of a regulation of
[OTC] securities markets with caution." Id.
371. 83 CONG. REC. 4451 (1938). Senator Maloney explained that:
Under this bill the Federal Government, through the [SEC], says to the invest-
ment bankers of the country, 'You may create your own association or associa-
tions. You may provide your own rules and your own regulations. We want
you to run your own business. We want a representation, however. We want a
right of review and supervision.'
2272 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 19:2230
encouraged the adaptation of the SRO structure to the OTC
market, believing it to be in the best interests of the investment
business and the public. 72 The Rudman Report found that the
early rationales for self-regulation remain valid.373 Current sup
porters of the NASD point to its success over the past three de-
cades in organizing the OTC market, once the refuge of compa-
nies that could not meet the NYSE's listing requirements. 37 4
Some proponents attest that if the market's success has come at
the expense of regulation, the NASD's adoption of the Rudman
Report's recommendations indicates the NASD's willingness to
improve regulation to ensure the success of the market.3 7 5
While the Select Committee did not evaluate the self-regula-
tory system governing the securities industry, it was generally
supportive of the SRO format.3 76 This is in spite of what the
Rudman Report considers the inherent conflicts of interest in
the system.3 77 Those who support self-regulation claim that the
technical aspects of the securities industry are best understood
by members of the industry.378 In addition, legislators and gov-
Id.
372. William O. Douglas, Chairman, SEC, Address Before the Bond Club of Hart-
ford (Jan. 7, 1938), in 83 ApP. TO THE CONG. REc. 68, 69 (1938). Seeking the support of
the financial community for the Maloney Act, Mr. Douglas explained that:
This type of self-regulation has unquestioned advantages. From the viewpoint
of the business they are obvious. Self-discipline is always more welcome than
discipline imposed from above. From the broad public viewpoint, such regu-
lation can be far more effective .... Self-regulation of this kind can be perva-
sive and subtle in its conditioning influence over business practices and busi-
ness morality. By and large, government can operate satisfactorily only by pro-
scription.
Id.
373. RUDMAN REPORT, supra note 9, at 1-5, R-3.
374. Knight, supra note 7, at HI.
375. Macdonald, supra note 319, at 90, 92. "At the end of the day, people aren't
going to use the market unless they think its fair." Id. (quoting Mary Schapiro, first
NASDR chief).
376. RUDMAN REPORT, supra note 9, at 1-5, R-3. Congress and the SEC, as well as
the securities industry, created the self-regulatory system. Id. at 1-5. It is up to Congress
and the SEC, therefore, to change the SRO format, if change is necessary. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o (1994) (providing for registered securities associations to oversee OTC market).
The self-regulatory system allows the industry expertise to monitor the industry. Silver
v. NYSE, 373 U.S. 341, 371 (1963) (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("The purpose of the self-
regulation provisions of the [1934 Act] was to delegate governmental power to working
institutions which would undertake, at their own initiative, to enforce compliance with
ethical as well as legal standards in a complex and changing industry.").
377. RUDMAN REPORT, supra note 9, at R-3.
378. U.S. Senator Francis Maloney, Radio Address (Feb. 25, 1938), in 83 APP. TO
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ernment regulators argue that it is in the members' best interest
to prevent behavior that may cause the public to lose faith in the
market, particularly where the market is a commercial enter-
prise.379 Even where self-regulation has been supported, how-
ever, the professional staffs have been deemed determinative of
the SRO's success by government regulators.38 °
III. EASDAQ SHOULD ADOPT THE SUGGESTIONS MADE IN
THE RUDMAN REPORT FOR IMPROVING NASDAQ
The EASD and EASDAQ illustrate similarities with the
NASD and Nasdaq."' 1 The NASD contends that its market
maker framework provides investors with the most favorable
stock price by requiring the market makers to compete with one
another,3 82 and EASDAQ plans to duplicate the market maker
system.3"' The NASD's employment of the Rudman Report's
suggestions will provide adequate solutions to present Nasdaq
problems. To ensure the fair and efficient operation of the mar-
THE CONG. REC. 789, 790 (1938). "[The Maloney Act] is written upon the theory that
regulation can best be achieved by the efforts of honest brokers and dealers them-
selves." Id.
379. Id. "If the investing public knew that the investment field was properly super-
vised, there would be a greater confidence, and it seems to me much more business."
Id. In addition, Nasdaq competes with the NYSE and other exchanges and reacts to
competitive pressures. Barnhart, supra note 354, at 1. For example, when major issuers
sought a short sale rule, and threatened to leave Nasdaq if such a rule was not adopted,
the Trading Committee recommended adoption of the rule the following week. Hal
Lux, Rudman Report Gives Rare Look Into NASD's Inner Workings: Ad Hoc, Ill-Informed Deci-
sion-Making the Norm, INV. DEALERS' DIG., Sept. 25, 1995, at 7.
380. See, e.g., William L. Cary, Self-Regulation in the Securities Industry, 49 A.B.A. J.
244, 245 (1963). Cary, then-Chairman of the SEC, generalized about effective self-regu-
lation:
[S]uccess depends in substantial part on the adequacy and ability of the pro-
fessional staff and the amount of responsibility vested in them. This in turn
rests upon the wisdom and vision of the board of governors. But the staff
provides a continuity and objectivity which is needed to raise standards in the
industry. I appreciate the philosophy - particularly of the NASD - that the
members should regulate their fellow members, but as the scope of self-regula-
tion enlarges, it will become increasingly arduous without an effective staff.
Id.
381. See supra notes 300-08 and accompanying text (discussing Nasdaq's influence
of EASDAQ).
382. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text (explaining Nasdaq' market
maker system).
383. See supra note 303 and accompanying text (describing EASDAQ's adoption of
Nasdaq's market maker system).
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ket, therefore, the EASD and EASDAQ should adopt several sug-
gestions made to the NASD and Nasdaq in the Rudman Report.
A. EASDA Q Will Follow Nasdaq
The EASD and EASDAQ model themselves on the NASD
and Nasdaq." 4 The services covered by the ISD 83 resemble
those provided by NASD members and Nasdaq. 86 The ISD,
therefore, was a necessary prerequisite to the creation of a pan-
European market based on Nasdaq.387 EASDAQ's governance
structure patterns that of Nasdaq,"' s and EASDAQ is hoping to
duplicate the success of Nasdaq.38 9
While the replication of NASD and Nasdaq in the European
Union will serve the needs of many constituencies,3 9 0 the con-
flicts of interest of which the U.S. market has been accused may
also be replicated because such conflict of interest are inherent
in the self-regulatory framework. 391 Given the limited securities
market regulation 92 and the current usage of SROs in the Mem-
ber States,3 93 however, the self-regulatory framework is the opti-
mal governance structure for EASDAQ. EASDAQ must mitigate
the potential conflicts of interest to attract the investors required
384. See supra notes 300-03 and accompanying text (discussing Nasdaq's influence
of EASDAQ).
385. See supra notes 218-22 and accompanying text (enumerating investment serv-
ices covered by ISD).
386. See supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text (discussing functions of NASD
members trading on Nasdaq).
387. See supra note 217 and accompanying text (referring to ISD as regulatory re-
quirement for establishment of EASDAQ).
388. See supra note 250 and accompanying text (discussing EASD as modelled on
NASD).
389. See supra note 366 (discussing EASDAQ's perception of SEC and Department
ofJustice investigations of Nasdaq). EASDAQ measures Nasdaq's success by its tremen-
dous growth, the increased number of initial public offerings in the United States, and
Nasdaq's position as the market in the United States with the most issues traded. EAS-
DAQ supra note 11, at 10-11.
390. See supra notes 273-75 and accompanying text (discussing constituencies of
EASDAQ).
391. See supra notes 377-79 and accompanying text (describing conflicts of interest
inherent in self-regulatory framework).
392. See supra notes 160, 168 and accompanying text (discussing limited securities
regulation by Member States).
393. See supra notes 172-75 and accompanying text (discussing SROs in United
Kingdom); see also supra notes 193-96 and accompanying text (discussing SROs in Ger-
many).
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to make the market a success.3 9 4 Without the confidence of in-
vestors, EASDAQ will not be sufficiently liquid to enable SMEs to
raise the capital they require to grow. 95 EASDAQ therefore,
must balance the needs of all its constituencies: the desire of
investors for a fair market,3 96 the need of SMEs for a liquid mar-
ket,3 97 and the requirement of the EASD members for a profita-
ble market.3 98
The national securities markets in the European Union, rec-
ognizing the growing internationalization of the markets, 399 are
introducing additional securities regulation aimed at attracting
individual investors from their own nations, as well as institu-
tional investors from the international community. 400 This addi-
tional regulation is primarily an extension of the existing self-
regulatory structure. 41 1 EASDAQ adoption of a self-regulatory
structure like that of Nasdaq, therefore, is not consistent with
regulation of the securities market for the purpose of balancing
its members' needs with those of the investors it hopes to draw.
B. The Rudman Report Adequately Addresses Nasdaq's Deficiencies
The NASD premises its support for the market maker
framework on the assumption that competition among the mar-
ket makers will produce the most favorable stock price for inves-
tors.40 2 If investors do not agree, they will not purchase stocks
394. See Ingo Walter & Roy Smith, The Worldwide Battle for Money, STERNBUSINESS,
Winter 1996, at 6-7 (excerpting INGO WALTER & Roy SMrrH, GLOaAL BANKING (forth-
coming 1996)). "The institutional investors of the United States ... have made their
impact on developing Euro-equity markets by demanding the same high standards of
research, trading and brokering they enjoy at home." Id.
395. See supra note 245 and accompanying text (discussing liquidity needs of
SMEs).
396. See supra notes 186-87 and accompanying text (discussing investors' concerns
with minimally regulated markets).
397. See supra note 245 and accompanying text (discussing financing requirements
of SMEs).
398. See supra note 245 and accompanying text (explaining interests of venture
capital funds).
399. See Warren, Global Harmonization, supra note 186, at 185-87 (discussing inter-
nationalization of securities markets).
400. See id. at 188-89 (discussing increased regulation of national securities mar-
kets).
401. See supra note 169 (discussing FSA and preference for SROs over governmen-
tal regulation).
402. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text (explaining Nasdaq's market
maker system).
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quoted on Nasdaq.4 °5 To increase the liquidity of their issues,
companies then will be forced to move their listings to an alter-
native market, such as an exchange. 4 The NASD and Nasdaq,
therefore, will adapt to the requirements of the market or lose
business.40 5 The inherent conflicts of interest in the self-regula-
tory format can be minimized through the functioning of com-
petitive forces.
The NASD's establishment of the Select Committee in re-
sponse to public criticism of its regulation of Nasdaq suggests
that the competitive forces in the market function properly.40 6
The dissemination of information through academic studies
4 7
and the press 408 armed the public, allowing it to voice outrage at
possible inequities in the management of Nasdaq.4°9 The NASD
reacted by chartering the Select Committee 410 and implement-
ing many of its suggestions.41 1 The NASD recognized that pro-
tecting its self-interest required adopting new procedures or los-
ing issuers and investors to competing securities markets.
The segregation of the disciplinary responsibilities of the
NASD into the NASDR creates an independent entity charged
with the enforcement of NASD rules and procedures.412 This
independence allows the NASDR to focus on the regulation of
Nasdaq without the influence of powerful constituencies.41 3
While the NASDR's independence can be maintained only if it is
403. See Barnhart, supra note 354, at 1 (discussing SEC's increase from 100 to 500
of unlisted OTC securities that Chicago Stock Exchange is authorized to trade).
404. See supra note 379 and accompanying text (discussing competitive pressures
exerted by major issuers on Nasdaq).
405. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (discussing source of profits made
by market makers).
406. See supra notes 354, 379 and accompanying text (discussing influences of
competitive pressures on fairness of securities markets).
407. See supra note 136 and accompanying text (discussing academic study indicat-
ing possible collusion among market makers in setting spreads).
408. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (reviewing criticisms of NASD's gov-
ernance of Nasdaq).
409. See supra notes 7, 136, 146 and accompanying text (discussing studies and
criticisms of Nasdaq).
410. See supra notes 20-21, 143-45 and accompanying text (discussing Select Com-
mittee establishment).
411. See supra note 319 and accompanying text (discussing implementation of
NASDR).
412. See supra notes 317-22 and accompanying text (establishing NASDR as auton-
omous from NASD).
413. See supra notes 317-32 and accompanying text (discussing Rudman Report's
recommendation for creation of NASDR).
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staffed by individuals who support fair and consistent regulation
of the market, early evidence indicates that the NASDR is devel-
oping into such an independent body.4"
The Rudman Report adequately addresses the inadequacies
of the NASD's governance of Nasdaq by focusing on the source
of the criticisms of the NASD, the self-regulatory structure.4 15
The inherent conflicts of interest in the self-regulatory structure
fostered an environment in which market makers allegedly
could collude 4 6 and large market makers allegedly could domi-
nate smaller investment firms and individual investors. 41 7 The
Rudman Report addresses the NASD's structural deficiencies
while allowing the self-regulatory structure that produced Nas-
daq's successes to continue.418
C. EASDAQ Should Adopt the Rudman Report's Suggestions
EASDAQ has established its mission as providing a regu-
lated securities market that is liquid, efficient, and fair.4 19 To
ensure fulfillment of this mission, the EASD and EASDAQ
should adopt several suggestions made to the NASD and Nasdaq
in the Rudman Report. These suggestions address the need for
additional public representation, 420 a strong commitment to in-
dependent disciplinary review,421 and professional manage-
ment.422 Because the EASD will govern EASDAQ under a self-
regulatory framework similar to the structure under which the
NASD governs Nasdaq, EASDAQ will encounter the same
problems faced by Nasdaq. 48 Adoption of the Rudman Report's
414. See supra note 319 (discussing recent hiring of new NASDR chief).
415. See supra notes 144-46 and accompanying text (discussing Rudman Report's
focus on NASD's governance of Nasdaq).
416. See supra note 136 and accompanying text (discussing study finding collusion
among market makers).
417. See supra note 150 and accompanying text (discussing dominance by large
market makers of Nasdaq governance).
418. See supra notes 149, 307 and accompanying text (discussing Rudman Report's
support for self-regulatory structure).
419. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (outlining mission of EASDAQ).
420. See supra notes 328-32 and accompanying text (discussing Rudman Report's
recommendations for increased public representation in NASD governance).
421. See supra notes 317-32 and accompanying text (reviewing Rudman Report's
suggested creation of NASDR).
422. See supra notes 309-41 and accompanying text (reviewing recommendations
of Rudman Report).
423. See supra notes 251-52 and accompanying text (discussing EASD's governance
of EASDAQ).
1996] 2277
2278 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 19:2230
suggestions will lend credibility to EASDAQ's self-regulatory
structure because the result will be equal bargaining power
amongst the constituencies the EASD, as an SRO, is intended to
represent.
European venture capitalists are playing a major role in the
establishment of EASDAQ because their industry depends upon
a liquid market for the equity flotations of SMEs.4 24 EASDAQ
will not be a liquid market, however, unless it can attract inves-
tors.4 25 EASDAQ is aware that its market must be strictly regu-
lated given the lower listing requirements demanded of the mar-
ket for SMEs and the assurances of a fair market that investors
demand prior to investing.126 EASDAQ should be equally sensi-
tive to the perception of self-dealing that can accompany the
self-regulatory structure.42 v
Investors will perceive that the inherent conflict of interest
in the self-regulatory format is minimized when constituencies
besides those affiliated with the SRO are represented. 428 The
Rudman Report's concern with public representation on the
NASD Board and the Nasdaq Board are equally relevant to the
EASD and EASDAQ. Currently, fifty-nine percent of the EAS-
DAQ Board consists of EASD members.4 29 The success of a se-
curities market depends on the liquidity of the market,43 which
is achievable only if the market can attract investors.43' In turn,
investors are attracted to markets that are perceived as fair.4 32
Adequate public representation on the governing boards of the
market and its SRO assures investors that the market is treating
424. See supra notes 208-09, 244-47 and accompanying text (outlining role of
EVCA in establishing EASDAQ).
425. See supra note 261 and accompanying text (discussing market liquidity).
426. See supra notes 260, 285 and accompanying text (describing EASDAQ's inten-
tion of becoming highly regulated market).
427. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing suggestions of self-dealing
by NASD in its governance of Nasdaq).
428. See supra notes 312, 328-32 and accompanying text (explaining benefits to
individual investors of public representation within NASD's governance structure).
429. See supra note 270 and accompanying text (describing EASDAQ Board). Ten
of the 17 members of the EASDAQ Board, or 58.82%, are EASD members. EASDAQ
supra note 11, at 7.
430. See supra note 261 (defining liquidity).
431. See supra notes 186-87 and accompanying text (discussing concerns that AIM
will not attract investors).
432. See supra notes 180-87 and accompanying text (describing U.K. markets' at-
tempts to attract investors).
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them fairly.433
Public representation, however, is not sufficient to avoid
conflicts of interest. If the growth of EASDAQ achieves its po-.
tential, conflicts of interest will pit one EASD member against
another.434 EASDAQ must commit, therefore, to the prevention
of unfair practices. Where such actions cannot be prevented,
enforcement of the rules and procedures governing the market
is imperative.4 5 The enforcement, however, must follow proce-
dures that ensure the protection of the parties' rights. 36 Not
only the market, but the disciplinary process, must be fair to
maintain the confidence of the market's constituencies.
EASDAQ in its desire to replicate the successes of Nas-
daq,43 7 remains unconcerned about the potential conflicts of in-
terest in a self-regulatory environment.438 Although EASDAQ in-
tends to include in its governance structure an independent ap-
peals body,43 9 it is not clear that the appeals body will consider
appeals from disciplinary procedures." 0 In the alternative, EAS-
DAQ should provide for regulation of the market by an entity
unaffiliated with the EASD to ensure that enforcement of EAS-
DAQ's rules and procedures is conducted in an unbiased man-
ner.
The self-interest of the EASD Board in the success of EAS-
DAQ will be a key to its achievement. 441 This self-interest, how-
ever, may cloud the decisions of EASD Board members. A pro-
fessional staff can prevent any particular member of the EASD
from exercising undue influence in the management of the mar-
ket, provided it is sufficiently independent not to be intimidated
433. See supra notes 328-32 and accompanying text (discussing Rudman Report's
rationale for adding public representation to NASD's governance structure).
434. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing criticisms of NASD's gov-
ernance of Nasdaq).
435. See supra notes 318-21 and accompanying text (discussing NASDR's enforce-
ment responsibility).
436. See supra note 319 and accompanying text (discussing NASDR's creation of
discipline and enforcement procedures).
437. See supra note 366 (discussing EASDAQ's perceptions of Nasdaq).
438. See supra note 366 (describing EASDAQ reaction to SEC and Department of
Justice investigations of NASD practices).
439. See supra note 280 and accompanying text (discussing EASDAQ's independ-
ent international appeals body).
440. EASDAQ, supra note 11, at 17.
441. See supra notes 370-80 and accompanying text (discussing self-regulation of
securities industry).
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by the members. 442 This professional staff can prevent the con-
centration of power in the most powerful EASD members,443
most likely the investment banks4 " that will be required to spon-
sor SMEs seeking inclusion on EASDAQ.44 5
CONCLUSION
The commitment of the EASD and EASDAQ to the types of
regulatory suggestions made in the Rudman Report will
strengthen the support of the Member States for the creation of
a market intended to meet the needs of the European Union as
a whole. These needs include greater liquidity, a more competi-
tive high-technology industry, growth potential of employment
by SMEs as their futures improve, and support for the entrepre-
neur in providing a method of raising capital and exiting from
the then-public company. Echoing the successes of Nasdaq need
not come at the price of replicating the controversies that have
surrounded it. Therefore, the adoption by EASDAQ of the Rud-
man Report's suggestions for Nasdaq will ensure the success of
EASDAQ as a fair and efficient securities market.
442. See supra notes 333-34 and accompanying text (discussing Rudman Report's
recommendation of stronger professional staff).
443. See supra note 133 and accompanying text (discussing Trading Committee).
444.. DiCTIONARY OF FINANCE, supra note 3, at 210. An investment banker acts as an
intermediary between the issuer of securities and investors. Id.
445. See supra note 285 and accompanying text (discussing inclusion requirements
for EASDAQ).
FORDHAM
INTERNATIONAL
LAW JOURNAL
INDEX
VOLUME 19
FORDHAM
INTERNATIONAL
LAW JOURNAL
VOLUME 19 JUNE 1996 NUMBER 5
BOARD OF EDITORS
ZAIN E. HUSAIN
Senior Articles Editor
TENLEY ADAMS
Notes & Articles Editor
DANIELA LEVARDA
Notes & Articles Editor
THOMAS C. SINGHER
Notes & Articles Editor
CHRISTENA ALEXANDROU
MEENAKSHI AMBARDAR
CHRISTINA CALISE
LISA CARTAFALSA
LISA M. CIRANDO
AMY FLEISCHMANN
JOSH FUTERMAN
ALLAN GALPER
ANNA ALVAR
RICHARD P. BOWMAN
DoRIs P. CHANG
MELISSA CHAPNICK
LINDA CHEUNG
ROBERT CHUNG
ELENA D'AGUSTINO
KRISTIN D'AMICO
JENNIFER A. DAVIS
DEREK DENCKLA
TIMOTHY DOCKERY
KENNETH DUCK
GREGG ENGLEHARDT
PALMINA FAVA
BASHEVA GENUT
MATI GOLDFARB
ROBERT GORZELANY
TODD HALPERN
JILL HEITLER
JOSEPH C. SWEENEY
Professor of Law
Fordham University
GIDEON A. MOOR
Editor-in-Chief
KRISTIN T. ROY
Managing Editor
CHARLES DE JAGER
Special Publications Editor
ROCHELLE TARLOWE
Business & Articles Editor
PAUL J. LIGHTFOOT
Notes & Articles Editor
ASSOCIATE EDITORS
DANIEL GALPERN
ALEXANDRA HANER
EDWARD HAYNES
MARGARET A. HEALY
SHARI N. HINES
GREGORY HOTAUNG
BRUCE JACOBS
NIRAL KALARIA
JORDAN LIPPNER
STAFF
VIVIAN HUELGO
RAVIND KARAMSINGH
AUSTIN KEYES
NITIN KHAEE
GIAN-CARLO LAGUZZA
STEPHEN LASALA
ANDREW L. LEE
DEBORAH LICHTENSTEIN
EVELYN LIM
KATHLEEN N. McCARTHY
KEY A. MENDES
JOSEPH R. MOLKO
FLORENCE NOVELLINO
SEAN O'DONNELL
CATHY S. PAIK
DARSHAN PATEL
JANET REARDON
KAI I. REBANE
FACULTY ADVISORS
LUDWIK A. TECLAFF
Professor of Law, Emeritus
Fordham University
MARC W. LEVY
Writing & Research Editor
IAN KELLEY
Notes & Articles Editor
LUKE A. MCGRATH
Notes & Articles Editor
SCOTT A. TRAINOR
Notes & Articles Editor
SUSIE MALLOY
FRANCIS R. MONACO
JOSH PROTASS
STACEY RAPPAPORT
JULIAN RILEY
HEATHER M. SAGER
ROBYE SHAW
SCOTT WELKIS
JAMIE Joy REIFFEL
JASON RIMLAND
NANCYJ. ROCKER
MELISSA ROORER
VICTOR E. SALERNO
KEVIN SCANLAN
BRETF A. SCHER
HOWARD SCHRAGIN
JILL M. SICILIANO
TOBY S. SOLI
JOSEPH C. SPONHOLZ
JOSEPH E. STRAUSS
KENNETH M. SWISSTACK
ALEXANDER TRIPP
NAEEM VARGO
MAIA A. VOLARICH
JANET WALSH
OREN WARSHAVSKY
SUSAN YANG
ROGERJ. GOEBEL
Professor of Law
Fordham University
